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Recent writing in the anthropology of affect and cognate fields has positioned hope as a useful category 
with which to examine socio-political life and formulate a political and theoretical response adequate 
to its form. This dissertation extends this endeavour by exploring the ‘hopeful projects’ mothers and 
families undertake in order to secure their children’s futures in contemporary Cape Town. Based on 
ethnographic research conducted with Black mothers between March and October 2018, I argue that 
the supposedly private maternal hopes my interlocutors hold are in fact indexical of the ways in which 
social inequality functions and becomes manifest in everyday life and care. Situated at the interface of 
embodied experience and political histories, their hopes are indicative of how liberal logics of self-
extension, self-mastery, and self-maximisation are inhabited to produce alternative futures. At the same 
time, however, such hopes are continually undone by contexts of intractable structural violence and 
deprivation, reinvested into normative notions of kinship, domesticity, sexuality, and the body, or 
marshalled to perform reparative work that should properly fall under the purview of the state. In 
detailing the ways in which my interlocutors attempt to craft more capacious, more just, and more 
materially abundant futures for their children, I illustrate the affective entailments of life-building in 
post-Apartheid South Africa. 
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 “Paradoxically, hope is on intimate terms with despair. It asks for more than life promises. It is 
poised for disappointment.” 
- Cheryl Mattingly1 
  
“Power organises even our truest obligations, no matter our good intentions,  
no matter our desires.” 
- Elizabeth A. Povinelli2 
 
“When do norms become forms?” 





1 Mattingly (2010: 3) 
2 Povinelli and Turcot DiFruscia (2012: 83) 





First, let’s start with a story, a paradigmatic example of some of the arguments I will flesh out in this 
dissertation. In Robyn’s4 office one afternoon, I asked her to tell me a story about one of her children, 
her favourite story. She beamed. “Well, Kirby’s journey has been astounding,” she started. When he 
was twenty-four months old she took him to the paediatrician for a check-up. Although he was generally 
in good health, something seemed to be amiss. “They gave him a car and expected that he would ride 
it around,” she said, “make ‘vroom-vroom’ sounds, that kind of thing. But he didn’t. He just turned it 
on its head and spun the wheel. He also didn’t respond when his name was called, which children that 
age usually do, even if they can’t verbally respond or don’t understand what you’re saying.” Kirby, it 
became clear, had not reached many of his developmental milestones, particularly the ones for language 
and imaginative play.5 
 Robyn had, however, been tentatively aware of some of this, as her graduate research in 
linguistics had taught her much about child language acquisition. To her dismay, many of the things 
she learnt did not, in the months she took care of her son, materialise for him. The paediatrician thus 
recommended that the family see a neurologist because she was concerned about the possibility that the 
boy might have Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), something that, again, Robyn had suspected, since 
she spent many an afternoon Googling what might be wrong. Their visit to the neurologist some weeks 
later proved decisive: “the neurologist came back with a diagnosis of Pervasive Developmental 
Disorder Not Otherwise Specified [PDD-NOS], which meant that he had markers of ASD but not 
 
4 All names mentioned in this dissertation are pseudonyms.  
5 In South Africa, it is advised that parents bring children to medical clinics for regular check-ups, especially 
during the first six weeks, at nine months, at eighteen months, and again at twenty-four months. During these 
check-ups, medical practitioners will usually perform various kinds of immunisation and screen for development 
(including developmental disabilities) and growth. The developmental screening monitors the child's physical 
and psycho-social development and checks if they have reached certain developmental milestones, such as 
sitting, standing, crawling, walking, talking, and handling objects. The growth screening entails the regular 
measurement of the child's weight and, sometimes, height. If there are problems, the child is referred to a 
specialist clinic or rehabilitation professional. See here for the Western Cape Department of Health’s (WCDH) 




enough to return a full diagnosis of Autism or Asperger’s Syndrome.” And so, Robyn’s “hopeful 
project” began.  
 The family quickly embarked on an intensive intervention program that included speech 
therapy and occupational therapy. Robyn reached back into her undergraduate and postgraduate studies 
for ideas that might serve her quest. She engaged with the work of the psychologist B.F. Skinner, who, 
as she put it, “said that language is a behaviour and, in the same way you can modify other behaviours, 
through reward and punishment, for example, you can modify language.” She compared Skinner to the 
linguist Noam Chomsky, who, as she put it, “talks about the innateness of language and how we are 
born with brains that are wired for language and all we need is the input from language around us to 
activate this.” To her mind, Skinner’s approach made more sense – “if language is innate my son would 
have talked by then,” she said – and so she undertook, in addition to speech and occupational therapy, 
various games and activities at home that aligned with this approach. 
 Still distressed at the slow pace of his language acquisition, however, she persistently reached 
out to the Centre for Play and Learning in Kenilworth, Cape Town. “I called and emailed and called 
and emailed and called and emailed”. Then one day she took Kirby in for an assessment and in the very 
first session the speech practitioner got him to say “ball”. She begged the Centre to take him on, which 
they did, first once a week, then twice, then every day. “For two years I was the only one who could 
understand him because I spent the most time with him,” she said, “we did so many things; I felt like I 
was training him for the language Olympics!” By the time Kirby turned four years old he began 
speaking in full sentences. “Today there’s no indication that he ever had language issues. He’s fully 
articulate, very intelligent, and ahead of some of his classmates in terms of language, and he has no 
speech impediment whatsoever.” 
 In her office that day Robyn remembered how, when he first said his own name, she burst into 
tears. “I cried because [the neurologist] had told me that he might never speak,” she said. Robyn felt 
that it was very unprofessional to dispense that kind of advice, especially since most people do not 
question medical professionals; their knowledge is viewed as unimpeachable. “She essentially gave me 
a death sentence, told me I must go home and ‘cope’,” she said, “thanks for your diagnosis, but I don’t 
accept your prognosis.” Her own research efforts, combined with the work of the staff at the Centre and 
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her partner and family’s support, is what allowed her “hopeful project” to come to fruition and achieve 
some kind of success. When she and Kirby bumped into the neurologist on a shopping trip when he 
was six years old, the latter “was astounded by his progress,” Robyn said, “and I was like ‘yeah, bitch,6 
because I didn’t listen to what you told me and I worked my ass off!’” 
 I share Robyn’s story here because I want to highlight how hopes for the future function as a 
diagnostic of the workings of power and inequality. Rather than merely a depiction of love for an 
intimate other, her hopes showed, for example, the overly large part institutions and authoritative forms 
of knowledge play in people’s lives. It reveals the socially pervasive fear of disability and the painful 
acknowledgement of the need to invest in “a particular culture’s imaginary of the ordinary, everyday, 
or acceptable,” (Mohamed and Shefer, 2015: 2). It illustrates the role access to resources and capital of 
various kinds (financial, social, cultural, intellectual) play in people’s life chances and capacity to build 
a futural otherwise. And it illustrates the position of the contemporary mother, still often the primary 
caregiver of her child, working at heroic and sometimes unsustainable levels to secure that child’s 
future.  
 
* * * 
 
Such Painful Knowledge is an ethnographic study of hope and the making of futures in post-Apartheid 
Cape Town. It is a study about what it means to raise and care for children in history’s shadow, and to 
gift them with futures that might be more capacious, more generous, and more just than the past or 
present have allowed. Hope, I will argue, is not simply a positive affective orientation toward the future, 
but also an index through which we might come to know the world and the limits and possibilities it 
holds. This knowledge, this painful knowledge, entangles wider power structures with the everyday 
making of kin and care and is grounded on a porous division between political and intimate life. The 
various ‘hopeful projects’ I will delineate here, therefore, diagnose how power works and inequality 
 
6 I am aware that my inclusion of Robyn’s use of the pejorative ‘bitch’ is not unproblematic. I have nevertheless 
retained it to highlight the density of the emotions she experienced during this time in her life.   
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functions, and how, in their various incarnations, they set forth the conditions within and through which 
futures are secured, life is reproduced, and persons come to be. 
 I began this research as part of a cohort of students working with Prof. Fiona Ross at the 
University of Cape Town, under the research project Anthropology of the First 1,000 Days of Life. The 
first thousand days of life refers to the period between a child’s conception and second birthday and has 
emerged as a new site for inquiry with profound implications for understandings of health and heredity.7 
It holds social and material consequences for global and local policy-making, public health discourse, 
and academic and lay concepts of life. Primarily informed by recent scientific explorations in 
neuroscience, epigenetics, and epidemiology, the period between a child’s conception and second 
birthday has thus been staged as a critical juncture determinative of future health and potential. The aim 
of our project, therefore, was to ethnographically examine how this public health discourse is engaged 
with and negotiated in both institutions and everyday life.  
 My interest in this field was to explore the kinds of futures mothers themselves imagined for 
their children. This question emerged out of my reading of some of the medico-scientific and public 
policy discourses attendant to this period, which are often rooted in a purportedly content- and value-
free notion of a “healthy future”. As an anthropologist, I intuited that people themselves might imagine 
a wide variety of futures for their children, and as a result, might undertake diverse decisions, actions, 
and practices to bring such futures into being, all in the context of specific socio-historical conditions. 
I therefore not only wanted to examine notions of futurity, in other words, the place of “the future in 
the present” (Malkki, 2001: 326-237; see also Bryant and Knight, 2019) but also contribute to 
ethnographic studies of motherhood in contemporary South Africa. 
 My reading before beginning my fieldwork taught me that most people are aware that there are 
a multiplicity of futures available to them (Kuzmanovic and Gaffney, 2017). That the making of such 
futures often hinges on moments and junctures, rather than clear, linear trails (Guyer, 2007). That 
although the future may not be entirely knowable, we can certainly understand, shape, and prepare for 
 
7 For a more comprehensive overview of this field of inquiry, see Michelle Pentecost’s introduction to the 




it (Sardar, 2010; Schultz, 2012). And that such forms of preparation are produced by notions of 
anticipation which give forms of speculative imagining the authority to act in the present (Adams, 
Murphy, and Clarke, 2009). Similarly, I also understood that “motherhood takes place within specific 
historical contexts framed by interlocking structures of race, class, and gender” (Collins, 1994: 56). 
That motherhood is not always or only nurturing, but may be inimical to new life in contexts of poverty 
and precarity (Scheper-Hughes, 1992). That the complexities of motherhood are further entwined with 
patriarchal definitions of womanhood more generally (Ichou, 2006; Mokobocho-Mohlakoana, 2008). 
And that mothering often takes place outside the mother-child dyad (Sudarkasa, 2004; Moore; 2013). 
 With this in mind, I thus began conducting ethnographic research with Black8 mothers between 
the ages of twenty-five and forty, all of whom are living, working, and raising children primarily in 
Cape Town, South Africa. My fieldwork took place between March and October 2018 and moved back-
and-forth between townships9 and suburbs in different parts of the city. It was through working with 
them that the concept of hope emerged for me. Hope is, of course, a positive affective orientation to the 
future and thus about imagined futures (Crapanzano, 2003; Miyazaki, 2004). It is social, which is why 
it is amenable to anthropological analyses (Crapanzano, 2003). And finally, as I have come to realise 
and will delineate in these pages, it is “on intimate terms with despair” (Mattingly, 2010: 3). Robyn’s 
hopes, for example, which I shared earlier in this Introduction, illustrated a catalogue of social and 
political demands and obligations people need to fulfil for life to be reproduced. Her hopeful horizons 
thus not only give us insight into the form and substance of the prospective worlds she desires for her 
son but can also be read as a critical account of her given world.  
 
8 My use of the word “Black” here is drawn from the Black Consciousness movement and is used to strategically 
signify the racialised groups that were oppressed during Apartheid. I am averse to, and do not wish to rehearse, 
Apartheid-era racial classifications (white, black African, coloured, Indian). At the same time, I recognise that the 
strategic essentialist use of "Black" as a racial signifier collapses the Apartheid-era hierarchisation of race and 
their attendant experiences and effects. Resultantly, in instances where Apartheid-era categories are salient to 
the discussion, I will make careful use of them for analytical purposes. Nonetheless, I affirm the Black 
Consciousness notion of “Black” because it enables political solidarity between formerly racialised populations 
and in so doing contests the power of white supremacy and, in particular, its tactics of divide and rule. 
9 In South Africa, the word “township” is used to refer to urban living areas that are often under-resourced 
and/or underdeveloped. These tend to be located on the periphery of major cities and are usually inhabited by 
the city's Black residents. Historically, most people living in townships have either been moved there as a result 
of Apartheid-era forced removals or settled there as migrant labourers due to the township's proximity to 
employment opportunities available in the city. 
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 As I will show throughout this dissertation, the supposedly private maternal hopes Robyn and 
my other interlocutors hold are indexical of how social inequality functions and becomes manifest 
everyday life and care. Situated at the interface of embodied experiences and political histories, their 
hopes are indicative of how liberal logics of self-extension, self-mastery, and self-maximisation are 
inhabited to produce alternative futures. At the same time, their hopes are also continually undone by 
contexts of intractable structural violence and deprivation; reinvested into normative notions of kinship, 
domesticity, sexuality, and the body; or marshalled to perform reparative work that should properly fall 
under the purview of the state. The conventional binary between structure and agency – central to much 
social-scientific thinking over the last hundred years – thus needs to be put on hold in order to grasp at 
the richness and complexity of the decisions and actions assembled here. The agentive practices I 
delineate do not always or only resist and protest social norms, but may also inhabit and refurbish them 
as a means of cultivating alternative, and often more fruitful, lifeworlds. In other words, agency can 
occur even within moments of subjugation. In this vein, my work is situated alongside feminist and 
queer anthropologists such as Mahmood (2005) and Weiss (2011) who have attempted to devise more 
nuanced understandings of agency, intentionality, and transformation that do not neatly map onto the 
Enlightenment values of individual freedom and autonomy.  
 Although this study aims to examine the hope and its place as a “structure of feeling” (Williams, 
1977) in contemporary South Africa, it also has its limits. While this study is about how people make 
and unmake prospective futures, it is not a study of futurity as such, but rather about a specific way of 
inhabiting futurity, namely, through hopefulness. This is because I am only writing about one of the six 
orientations that have been identified as ways of relating to the future (the others are anticipation, 
expectation, speculation, potentiality, and destiny; see Knight and Bryant, 2019). Furthermore, although 
my arguments here emerge out of fieldwork conducted with mothers and the hopes they have for their 
children’s futures, this is also not a study of motherhood as such. This is because, although I emphasise 
the mothering practices my interlocutors undertook to secure their children’s futures, I engage with the 
category of “motherhood” as a discursive entity and personal identity only provisionally; see Walker’s 
(1995) discussion on why it is important to engage with “motherhood” as simultaneously a discourse, 
an everyday practice, and a personal identity. 
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 My contribution nonetheless holds value, two of which I will note here. Firstly, the argument 
that hope is a useful category for examining socio-political life has, of course, been articulated by other 
scholars. However, I augment this assertion by illustrating how the form and content of particular hopes 
– rather than just the reasons for their necessity (Harvey, 2000; Ahmed, 2004) or their distribution in 
society (Hage, 2003) – provide us with critical insight into the structure of a given society. Secondly, 
much writing on the category of hope has occurred in the Global North (my literature search was 
indicative of this) and so my efforts here is thus an attempt to examine the category from a Global South 
and specifically South African perspective. This is not merely to enumerate its various incarnations, but 
also to study it contextually and understand it as an affective experience whose style and substance, 
while resonating with experiences found elsewhere, is profoundly context-specific.  
 This dissertation is divided into six sections. In Notes on a Method, I outline my fieldsites and 
introduce my research participants, while also sketching the theoretical approaches which underpin my 
analysis, the methods I deployed to gather data, and the ethical strategy I operationalised to remain 
morally accountable to both my interlocutors and the community of anthropologists I am situated in. In 
Chapter 1, The Promise of Hope: A Literature Review, I provide an overview of the key texts which 
have engaged the category of hope in recent social theory, emphasising those strands which figure hope 
as (1) an attribute of persons crafted in relation to others, (2) a moral and political claim to the future, 
and (3) a method of knowledge formation, situating my own work at the intersection of these strands.  
 In Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5, I provide ethnographic accounts of the myriad hopes held by my 
interlocutors Rachel, Nema, Thandiwe, Hlumile, Robyn, and Angela. Chapter 2, An Archive of 
Longings, focuses on Angela and Hlumile’s desire for “ordinary” objects and upward mobility in 
contexts in which such entities and endeavours are difficult to secure. In Chapter 3, (Normative) Objects 
of Desire, I turn to Rachel and Thandiwe’s affective investments in the normative objects of 
heterosexual marriage and private property as a means to stabilise and repair the uncertainty and failure 
of their prior kinship relations. In Chapter 4, The Politics of Sacrificial Love, I home in on Rachel and 
Nema’s efforts to self-discipline and remake themselves as “responsible” subjects, a process which, for 
them, precludes the intimacy of caring for their children on a daily basis. And in Chapter 5, Mothering 
and/as Transformative Pedagogy, I come to grips with Hlumile and Robyn’s efforts to prepare their 
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children for entry into local worlds marked by entrenched hierarchies and the perdurance of social 
suffering. Across these chapters, I illustrate how my interlocutors’ hopes reveal both the mechanisms 
of power and inequality and the various ways in which these ordinary women activate their agentive 























NOTES ON A METHOD 
 
On Places and People 
This research took place in Cape Town, South Africa. In particular, I conducted interviews and 
participant observation in the Cape Flats (primarily Bishop Lavis and Philippi), the Southern Suburbs 
(primarily Mowbray, Rondebosch, Kenilworth) and the Atlantic Seaboard (primarily Sea Point). These 
spaces are defined by their relation to Apartheid-era segregation: while the under-resourced townships 
of the Cape Flats were designed for the city’s Black inhabitants, the affluent Southern Suburbs and 
Atlantic Seaboard were designed for its white inhabitants. As a result, the uneven socio-economic 
features of these areas reflect Apartheid’s discriminatory distribution of resources while also revealing 
the slow pace of transformation post-1994. Although living in one part of the city rather than another 
does not automatically imply belonging to a particular socio-economic group or class,10 it does 
nevertheless mean that one has differential access to certain goods (such as schooling, for example) 
which then produces different hopes around which futures are certain, possible, or improbable. 
 Although this project is not a multi-sited ethnography, my decision to move between disparate 
social and geographic locations nonetheless holds methodological and epistemological entailments. 
While the locations mentioned before were my interlocutors’ residential neighbourhoods during my 
research, they are ‘mobile subjects’ (Nyamnjoh, 2013) with kinship networks and affective relations 
that stretch beyond these locations. Most of my interlocutors have lived in places other than the ones 
mentioned here.11 Furthermore, many of their most important relationships are with people who live 
elsewhere (see chapters 4 and 5) while some of their future aspirations also point toward other locations 
 
10 Recent writing on class and socio-economic mobility among the black middle-class in South Africa has 
illustrated that class identity is often experienced heterogeneously and articulated relationally and contextually 
(Phadi and Manda, 2013; Khunou, 2015; Krige, 2015). What this means is that there is not always a one-to-one 
correspondence between one’s experience of and identification with a particular social class and one’s actual 
access to financial and material resources. Angela’s complaints (in Chapter 2) is indicative of this: her desires, 
sensibilities, and aesthetic aspirations are profoundly middle-class, something that is incongruent with her 
location on the working-class Cape Flats.   
11 For example, Hlumile and Nema grew up in the Eastern Cape, Rachel in Citrusdal, and Thandiwe in 
Swellendam. Robyn was born in Durban and grew up in Johannesburg but also spent several years living in the 
United Kingdom as a teenager.  
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(see chapter 2). This is why I do not provide an exhaustive account of each of their local or residential 
communities as a mode of contextualisation. It is also why, following Gupta and Ferguson (1997a, 
1997b), I am hesitant to valorise place-based ethnographic research as the only, or ultimate, form of 
anthropological knowledge-building. As will become clear, my aim in this dissertation is not to provide 
a “thick description” (Geertz, 1973) of the lives and places under consideration here, but rather to make 
connections between everyday concepts (such as hope) and abstract social structures (such as race, 
class, gender) in order to illuminate how the former might provide insight into how we understand and 
respond to the latter.  
 Finally, the arguments delineated here are based on research conducted with six women – 
Angela, Hlumile, Nema, Rachel, Robyn, and Thandiwe. My fieldwork took place, intermittently, 
between March and October 2018. At the time I conducted my research, all of my participants had 
children younger than two years, while some of them also had older children. My recruitment process 
drew on both purposive and snowball techniques. Most of my interlocutors were approached, by me, to 
take part in the study because they fit the criteria I had set for the study, i.e. they were Black women 
between the ages of twenty-five and forty with at least one child in the first thousand days of life age 
bracket. The rest were introduced to me later. Although I commenced my research with seven women, 
one of them withdrew from the study after we had conducted a life-history interview; I thus do not share 
or invoke her story in this text. Below I offer short narrative descriptions of each of my research 
participants followed by a table with their demographic information:12 
 
• Angela is a neighbour of mine, her younger brother is a childhood friend. She enjoyed cooking and 
celebrity gossip, two hobbies we bonded over. At the time of my fieldwork, she was married to 
Dean with whom she had two children – Andrew and Lindsay – and lived in Bishop Lavis. My 
interviews with her were wonderful; she often treated them like an opportunity to get things of her 
chest, which made for a plaintive but poignant mood. I appreciated her candour, however, because 
it taught me that I was probably not as bad an interviewer as I had imagined.  
 
12 Please note that this information is only applicable to the time I undertook my fieldwork. Most of my research 
participants have since moved to other locations, changed forms of employment, or had more children. 
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• I came to know Hlumile through Nema. She had the most infectious laughter and took the best 
selfies. At the time of my fieldwork, she was married to Lonwabo with whom she had two daughters 
– Liya and Thando – and lived in Mowbray. During my interviews, conversations, and casual 
check-ins with Hlumile, she liked informing of whatever business venture she was currently 
working on. She was very ambitious and strategic, a great planner. 
• Nema is a friend and former colleague. At the time of my fieldwork, she had a daughter, Omiyo, 
who was just over a year old and lived with Nema’s parents in the Eastern Cape. Nema and I have 
an easy relationship that began in 2015 when, at a two-day workshop, we snuck out for a cigarette 
break and she borrowed my lighter. Numerous cigarette breaks followed that one and most of my 
interviews and conversations with her took place under pleasure-seeking circumstances, in bars and 
restaurants. She is curious and funny and a natural hostess, with an incredible capacity to make 
everyone feel at ease. Our research encounters were a joy. 
• Rachel is also a neighbour. At the time of my fieldwork, she lived in Bishop Lavis with her sons 
Luciano, Xavier, and Damien. We had known each other since childhood but never moved in the 
same circles and I only came to know her better in 2017, when I invited her to take part in a small 
research project that then provided the impetus for this project. She was tall and quite obviously 
beautiful. In an alternate universe, she might have been a successful fashion model. She was also a 
loud-mouth, a tinge self-involved, and not at all an attentive listener – but I always enjoyed this 
quality about her and found it immensely comic, because she reminded me of a character from the 
television series Girls. Our research encounters usually entailed me hanging out with her and her 
sons over the course of an afternoon, chatting and watching television at her home. 
• Robyn is a former colleague. A lover of literature, a vegan, and a natural “feminist killjoy” (Ahmed, 
2010), she and I bonded over our mutual fondness for reading and interest in socially just 
pedagogies. During my fieldwork, she lived in Tokai and then Kenilworth with her sons Kirby and 
Sam (the former later moved to Northern Ireland to live with his father and paternal grandparents; 
see Chapter 5). As a child, she and her family lived in locations across South Africa and the United 
Kingdom, an itinerancy that perhaps explained her peculiar streak of independence; Robyn struck 
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me as the kind of person who could start a new life in another country tomorrow and do it with no 
fuss or frills. My interviews with her mostly consisted of cosy conversations in her office. 
• I came to know Thandiwe through a friend. At the time of my fieldwork, she lived in Sea Point 
with her son Lungelo, only a few months old. She was driven, polished, and articulate – like a 
school head girl or an avatar for bourgeois feminism – but also self-deprecating and darkly funny. 
We connected over a shared interest in architecture and interior design. Although our interviews 
and conversations were slow-going to begin with – she was the only one of my research participants 









The arguments I forward in this dissertation are framed by two distinct theoretical perspectives: black 
feminist theory and affect theory. I have not, of course, engaged exhaustively with the literature 
travelling under these banners, nor have I followed them religiously in my interpretations. Instead of 
treating them as rigid explanatory frameworks, I have deployed them as ‘lenses’ through which to come 
to terms with and make sense of my data. They have, thus, offered me questions with which to approach 
my data, rather than prefabricated answers to what that data might mean. Such a stance is crucial, I 
believe, not only toward fulfilling the ethnographic injunction of understanding the social world on its 
own terms, but also toward ensuring that an account of what life in this corner of Africa might mean is 
not obscured or disfigured as a result of its encounter with analytical concepts that have emerged 
elsewhere.  
 The first theoretical approach I employ is black feminist theory. This body of knowledge 
emerged out of recognition of the double burden of oppression black women face in white supremacist 
and patriarchal societies (hooks, 1984; Hill-Collins, 2002). It thus offers a way of mapping social 
inequalities (Crenshaw, 1991) while also providing impetus to thinking about various social categories 
together, given how “the hierarchisation of being as lived experience in its messy contradictions 
[simultaneously] draws on race, gender, sexuality, class, nationality and able-bodiedness” (Mohamed, 
2018: 243). A specifically black feminist anthropology (McClaurin, 2001) brings these injunctions to 
bear on the anthropological project, placing black women’s experiences at the forefront and theorising 
gender in relation to various other identities, thus sharpening the focus on social and historical 
specificity the discipline has been known for. 
 Although I owe a great debt to US-based black feminisms, I am also influenced by black 
feminist studies of gender and sexuality in Africa more specifically. This is because these categories 
are not only social but also historical and temporal (Oyěwùmí, 2005), since, to provide one example, 
the governance and remaking of African expressions of gender and sexuality were a core component of 
the colonial enterprise and subsequent postcolonial regimes (Amadiume, 1988; Nyanzi, 2011). 
Although shifts in such expressions have, of course, taken place alongside changes in the political-
economy, there is still often, in South Africa at least, a continuation across time of how gender and 
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sexuality are understood, performed, and received (Ratele, 2009). An attentiveness to local 
manifestations of these categories is thus crucial to the arguments I unpack in this dissertation, 
particularly as they pertain to questions of marriage and kinship and how these figure in the making of 
alternative futures.  
 My use of these separate, but allied, versions of black feminist theory emerges, firstly, out of 
recognition of the fact that a sensitivity toward race, for example, is not necessarily intrinsic to the 
anthropological project but needs to be cultivated (Harrison, 2008). Furthermore, I deploy this approach 
because it allowed me to come to terms with how people’s location within and between given social 
categories take on particular meanings within certain contexts and lay the groundwork for their life 
chances and opportunities. Finally, I employ it because it allows me to centre the experiences of Black 
women and their families, while also using those experiences to mount a broader critical analysis of 
how hope functions, and how its fruition in the form of actual practices, relations, and objects is 
negotiated and sustained in the context of contemporary South Africa. 
 Among the strengths of this approach has been the fact that it alerts me to the importance, per 
Mohamed (2018), of paying attention to multiple social categories and their histories and present-day 
effects at the same time. Resultantly, the arguments I forward and the stories I share here are as much 
about the operation of race as they are about the organisation of gender, the effects of class, or the 
construction of able-bodiedness. At the same time, of course, a shortcoming of this approach is the fact 
that identities are processual and temporal, rather than categorical, and that our formation as subjects 
does not occur in discrete and analytically distinct ways (Brown, 2005). My own work here, however, 
mediates this by paying attention to how people are interpellated as a specific identity within a specific 
context, rather than assuming that such identities are fixed or unchanging across time and space.  
 Affect theory, the second theoretical approach I employ, gives an account of how affects, 
emotions, and feelings produce subject positions and relationships and, thus, the social world. This 
literature thus posits affects to be social entities, rather than personal and individual ones. Such an 
approach allows us to understand several questions more clearly, including how subjectivities and 
communities are crafted through “affective economies” (Ahmed, 2004) rather than reason alone. How 
affect makes ideology stick and produces ties with actual flesh-and-blood bodies (Sedgwick, 2003). 
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How affect in the present is linked to the past, thus giving present practices the weight of history (Tadiar, 
2004). How affect is intrinsic to the reproduction of (neo)liberal capitalism (Cvetkovich, 2012; 
Massumi, 2002). And how an analysis of affect will allow us to more clearly see how governmentality 
works (Povinelli, 2006).  
 Brian Massumi, one of the leading affect theorists writing today, proposes a distinction between 
emotion and affect in which the former is socialised, individualised, and expressed in language and 
gesture, and the latter is autonomous, pre-social, and non-rational (Massumi, 2002). For my project here 
I make no such distinction, for the simple reason that it does not move my analyses into other, more 
interesting, directions.13 Instead, I follow Hardt’s (2007) assertion that affect is a synthesis between 
mind and body as well as reason and passion. And like Cvetkovich (2012), I also use affect in a generic 
way to describe affects, emotions, feelings, as well as impulses and desires, that are both historically 
constructed and somatic and sensory and thus not always reducible to cognitive concepts and 
constructions alone.  
 I employ affect theory because my fieldwork made it clear to me that the decisions my 
interlocutors made and would make (vis-à-vis childcare and future-making) were both rational and 
emotional and intuitive. As Skoggard and Waterston (2015: 11) puts it, “human beings are as much 
feeling creatures as they are thinking ones. Hunches and intuition play a major role in reasoning, and 
passion provides impetus for action.” In an effort to circumvent the unnecessary and problematic binary 
between the rational and the emotional, the use of affect theory thus proves fruitful. Finally, looking at 
affect – especially the sharpness of particular affects and emotions in particular contexts or events – 
might also give me a deeper sense into how different futures are valued, feared or lusted after, although 
this should not be taken to mean that affects are more “authentic” than decisions that were carefully 
reasoned. Either way, affect theory offered me the tools to come to grips with and analyse the data with 
which I emerged from my fieldwork.  
 Among the strengths of this approach has been that it allows me to focus on the ordinary 
(Stewart, 2007) and then to make connections between the ordinary and broader public feelings and 
 
13 Although I do not differentiate between emotion and affect for pragmatic reasons, see Leys (2015) for a more 
in-depth examination of why this distinction cannot conceptually be sustained. 
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discourses that circulate when it comes to care and future-making, and to do so with a critical eye. It 
has also enabled me to pay attention to the sometimes fleeting aspect of affect, and thus to be continually 
on the lookout for how things change, not simply month to month, for example, but also moment to 
moment. On the other hand, a weakness of this approach has been that some affect theorists often 
attempt to make a distinction between emotion and reason in order to valorise the former because it has 
been unfairly sidestepped in favour of the latter (Leys, 2015: 455-458). My own work here, however, 
counters this tendency by illustrating that in everyday life and conversation the two cannot always or 
easily be disentangled from one another. 
 
On Methods 
One of my primary methods of investigation was participant-observation. Perhaps the key approach to 
data collection in anthropology, it emerges out of Malinowski’s (2005 [1922]) insistence that the 
anthropologist must immerse themselves in the lives of others to provide a cogent account of those lives 
and the social worlds they are entangled with. It is thus premised on coming to know people in their 
own social contexts, and accounting both for those contexts as well as the specific practices and 
relations through and within which people live and make meaning. In the context of my own research, 
this kind of “deep hanging out” (Geertz, 1998) took place, intermittently, over an eight-month period 
between March and October 2018 and was performed at my interlocutors’ homes and workplaces, as 
well as stores, coffee shops, parks, and other locations across Cape Town. Sometimes this would mean 
spending an afternoon with Rachel and her children at her home, having an after-work drink with Nema, 
or taking a walk with Thandiwe and her son on the Sea Point promenade on a Saturday morning. 
 I employed participant-observation primarily because it allows the anthropologist to become 
“the tool through which knowledge is gained” and hinges both on subjective and objective approaches 
to data-gathering (Ross, 2010: 10). It also allowed me to see the difference (if such a difference exists) 
between what people do and what they say they do, and to personally observe and account for the rules, 
reasons, and histories that may underpin people’s narratives and practices, but which may otherwise be 
unspoken or unacknowledged. In this vein, it allowed me, much more than formal interviews, to spend 
time with and have casual conversations with people in the spaces where life and care take place. As an 
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approach to being “in the thick of things”, participant-observation was thus crucial to understanding the 
heterogeneity through which people attempt to craft lives and futures in accordance with their ideals.
 Despite its many advantages, doing participant-observation in the context of my research 
project has not been easy. In fact, it has often been very arduous and time-consuming: both to myself, 
since I was working three part-time jobs while doing this research, as well as to my interlocutors, most 
of whom had full-time careers and were the primary caregivers to small children who require much care 
and attention. I also noticed that my most “successful” spells of participant-observation occurred with 
my interlocutor who was not employed and thus had more time to spend with me; there is something 
very odious about a research method whose success depends on economic precarity. Nevertheless, the 
intimacy built through spending time with people in contexts where they were most comfortable proved 
expedient and allowed me to build and (further) develop relationships that will extend beyond the 
completion of this project. 
 In addition to participant-observation, a second research method I made use of was life-history 
interviews. These are interviews in which people are asked to provide a personal account of their lives 
and to do so using their own words and timelines. Life-history interviews are premised on the 
assumption that the past inflects the present; in my own work, it also engages with how the past 
influences people’s imaginings of the future. The primary goal of life-history interviews is to understand 
the individual within the context of their own lives, and then to situate their experiences within a broader 
social and historical context (Atkinson, 2002; Moore, 2013). Although the subjective nature of life 
histories mean that they tend to be selective, contingent upon what can be remembered and what is 
amenable to being told, the aim is not to be overly prescriptive in questioning, but rather to have 
people’s narratives emerge naturally in light of the broader research questions that are posed.   
 As noted above, I employed life-history interviews primarily as a means of surfacing the ways 
in which my interlocutors’ past experiences influence their imaginings of and hopes for the future. This 
connection between past and future was important for two key reasons. Firstly, because it allowed me 
to account for the fact that people’s hopes and desires do not come from nowhere, but are instead often 
situated on a temporal continuum of how they understand and make sense of their past, present, and 
future. Secondly, given the relatively short nature of my fieldwork, conducting life-history interviews 
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also gave me some larger insight into my interlocutors’ past experiences, experiences that I do not 
otherwise necessarily know about or have access to, given that I was situated in their present and having 
conversations with them about their future. Most of my life history interviews were two to three hours 
long and took place over two sessions.  
 One of the weaknesses of life-history interviews is the fact that they are not necessarily 
historically accurate, insofar as they function as a kind of text, with its own highlights and elisions, 
rather than a perfect representation of an external past reality (Crapanzano, 1977). These narratives also 
tend to be circumscribed by particular conventions of storytelling, such as the classical notion of 
beginning, middle, and end (Blackman, 1991). My fieldwork further indicated that for people who are 
not accustomed to reflecting on and talking about their own lives, who are not members of what has 
been called “therapeutic culture” (Madsen, 2014), such an interview can be difficult.14 Nevertheless, I 
found life-histories useful because I am not interested in fact, but rather interested in meaning, and 
especially the kinds of meanings attached to past experiences, how they are perceived in the present, 
and whether or not they produce orientations toward or away from particular futures. 
 A third research method I made use of was vision boards. These are collages of photographs, 
drawings, and written text that are used to illustrate one’s dreams, hopes, and desires and are often used 
for inspirational purposes. They form part of the methodological repertoire of visual anthropology and 
arts-based research practise and allow for the emergence of non-verbal data within the context of a 
research project (Rose, 2004). What is more, they also form part of what Edgar (2004) calls imagework, 
namely, projects that utilise visuality to provide expression to people’s self-identities and worldviews 
and do so in a way that combines both rational and intuitive aspects of self. Despite being non-verbal, 
it nevertheless conveys people’s accounts of themselves and the world around them, accounts which 
then provide data for the anthropologist to analyse and interpret. 
 I used vision boards because I reckoned that these might provide a useful, non-verbal, avenue 
through which my interlocutors could convey their active imagination, visualisation, and fantasies vis-
à-vis their children’s’ futures and the hopes they have for these. Such vision boards could then be 
 
14I mediated such difficulties by being patient and encouraging the interviewee with supportive phrases and 
questions, for example, “interesting, tell me more” or “oh wow, then what happened?” 
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analysed alongside data gathered through participant-observation, my interlocutors’ past experiences 
as gleaned from life-history interviews, as well as my own analysis of the social and cultural 
understandings of parenting, hope, and futurity as these circulate in contemporary South Africa. This 
would prove expedient, especially since visual images are socially constructed (Pink, 2001) and 
indicative of “how we see, [and] how we are able, allowed, or made to see” (Foster, 1988), which means 
that such images can provide insight into broader socio-cultural values that might otherwise go 
unacknowledged.  
 Despite the strength of vision boards, a weakness is that unlike participation-observation and 
interviews, which required my interlocutors simply to be present and available to my inquiries, they 
ended up operating as a form of “homework” that was extraneous to our face-to-face research 
encounters. As a result, only two out of my six research participants worked on the vision boards, and 
with those that did, their vision boards were often incomplete. Both also featured personal information 
that meant that I could not photograph them for reproduction and dissemination here in this text. I would 
thus suggest that other researchers who use this method in future do it with or alongside their research 
participants. Nevertheless, the strength of the vision boards was that I was able to see how particular 
visions of social categories and forms organisation (especially of class) played out in what my 
interlocutors put down on their boards. It thus allowed them to communicate particular desires and 
hopes for the future, which I was then able to iteratively explore in follow up interviews. 
 
On Ethics 
Ethnographic research entails ethical consideration and an anticipation of the possibility of harm. 
Resultantly, I have attempted to craft an ethical praxis which seeks to both minimize personal harm 
during fieldwork, while simultaneously recognising the need to do justice to the complexity of my 
interlocutors’ lives. I have thus closely followed the guidelines set out by Anthropology Southern 
African (2008) and used these guidelines as an ethical stratagem as I undertook my research. Key among 
these guidelines is the requirement of informed consent, which I attained from my interlocutors both 
before and after our research encounters, ensuring that they are aware that they may refuse to participate 
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or withdraw from the project at any point. I have also attempted to ensure confidentiality and anonymity 
by providing all my interlocutors with pseudonyms of their choosing.  
 Although ethics codes are useful for the practical guidance they provide, their ‘checkbox’ 
approach might often emerge as yet another instantiation of what has elsewhere been “audit cultures” 
(Strathern, 2000). My own ethical praxis has thus focused on what Castañeda (2006) has called the 
difference between “the morals of anthropology” and “the ethics of ethnography” – with the former 
linked to questions of ethnographic representations of the Other, and the latter linked to in-the-field 
relationships. The first part of this ethical praxis, linked to the question of representation, is that my 
work contains within it the risk of contributing to deficit discourses (Candlin and Crichton, 2011) which 
present the people being researched as the problem rather than the social contexts in which they are 
situated. Mothers and families are often intimately aware of the risks involved in care and child-rearing 
and the materialisation of a wholesome future. Deficit discourses work to view any shortcomings in 
this terrain as a “problem” to be “solved”, rather than an implacable part of the messiness of human 
relationships and everyday life. This is especially salient in South Africa, where women, through the 
twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries, were and are often held solely accountable for their 
children’s well-being and thus made vulnerable to maternal blame should anything adverse happen to 
those children (Pentecost and Ross, 2019: 751). To counter this, I have therefore attempted to write 
capaciously and hold social conditions, rather than individual persons, at the forefront of my analyses.  
 The second part of this ethical praxis, linked to in-the-field relations, is that my work held the 
possibility of encountering particular kinds of violence, such as sexual or domestic abuse, child 
negligence, or alcohol or drug use. There was also the possibility that the futures imagined by my 
interlocutors may, in fact, be harmful to their children. While South Africa’s Children’s Act of 2005 
requires that professionals working with children immediately report instances of abuse to a child 
protection agency, the complications in such a move may have far-reaching, and perhaps even more 
detrimental, consequences. Fortunately, nothing intolerable emerged in my fieldwork and I have been 
able to build and/or extend personal relationships with most of my interlocutors. As a form of 
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reciprocity for taking part in my research, I gave each of them a gift consisting of a book and a card 
with a message of thanks.15  
 Finally, to add a note on reflexivity. Many of my interlocutors were friends, neighbours, and 
(former) colleagues. I have thus often had the experience of doing research “at home” as a “native 
anthropologist” (Narayan, 1993) in a context where their participation in my research – this favour they 
are doing me – would advance my career as a burgeoning anthropologist. Nevertheless, although I 
mostly worked with people who I knew well, our positionalities do not, of course, line up 
straightforwardly. Despite our points of connection (residential, professional, platonic), as a gay man 
who does not have children there are particular experiences that I did not have access to and, even if I 
did, may not think of as particularly salient. The arguments I make here are thus forms of “situated 
knowledge” (Haraway, 1988), given that who I am and how I have been shaped has affected what I was 
able to know and come to write about, though in ways, of course, that are not entirely transparent. 
Furthermore, as an anthropologist, I also have a very specific story to tell – namely, that the category 
of hope has conceptual usefulness for those interested in a critical anthropology because of its potential 
to unveil the mechanisms of power and inequality. If my writing here stays too close to this story at the 
expense of others it is not because I believe that other stories could call my conclusions in question, but 
rather because I am not interested in the goal of epistemic mastery: we cannot know everything, it is 
impossible to tell the whole story, and perhaps rather arrogant to attempt to do so. The chapters that 
follow are thus a partial account, and I have no doubt that my interlocutors’ lives are richer and far more 
complex than what I am able to demonstrate here. I ask my reader to bear these facts in mind as they 






15 There were also other forms of reciprocity during the course of my research. For example, whenever I visited 
Rachel’s home, I always brought snacks (chips, chocolate, nuts, orange juice, fruit, and so on) for her sons. 




The Promise of Hope: A Literature Review 
 
Introduction.  
Since the early 2000s, there has been an ongoing effort to reclaim the category of hope in social theory. 
This effort arose initially as a response on the part of Euro-American social theorists to what they 
viewed as the decline of hope in progressive politics with the ascendancy of (neo)liberal capitalism 
after the fall of the Soviet Union (Miyazaki, 2004: 1). However, moving beyond this early concern as 
to the ethical content and consequences of hope, subsequent theorists have utilised the category to 
reflect on how people make life possible under conditions of precarity, while others have exploited it 
for epistemological renewal and its ability to counter the “paranoid theory” (Sedgwick, 2003) we have 
inherited from various critical theoretical traditions. On all accounts, however, hope is deployed as 
something people do, a practice wrought by particular histories and relationships and oriented toward 
particular futures and ‘imaginative horizons’.  
 My interest in hope emerged during my research; I did not enter the field with it in my 
anthropological toolkit either as an analytic or a theory of the subject and society. Observing, listening 
to, and engaging in conversation with my interlocutors thus made hope and hopefulness visible as 
modes through which they talked about and worked toward the future. Bryant and Knight (2019) 
correctly point out that hope – as well as other orientations such as anticipation, expectation, 
speculation, potentiality, and destiny – are temporal trajectories through which the future becomes 
“real” in the present; they lend it its affective texture. Such orientations thus allow one to gain a foothold 
into the relationship between the future and action, providing a concrete way for thinking about how 
the future enfolds the present and the modes and reasons through which people prepare for it. 
 For this review, I have defined the scope of hope primarily by chronology and discipline. This 
is to say that most of the writings on hope to be referenced here have been produced within the last 
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thirty years and that the review thus excludes earlier writings on the topic16. Since it is not my aim to 
write a genealogy of the category, nor in my ability to write an exhaustive account of its usage, I have 
therefore focused on more recent texts while still recognising that the writers I do cite frequently 
reference these theoretical predecessors.17 Furthermore, most of the writing on hope to be referenced 
here is drawn from anthropology. However, I also cite scholars working in philosophy, psychology, 
sociology, and literary studies. I do this out of recognition of the fact that the disciplines often cannot 
be so easily untethered from one another and may contain significant overlaps, and also because many 
non-anthropologists provide insights that are particularly useful to the questions I address throughout 
this dissertation. 
 This review is divided into three sections and is organised along some of the major trends in 
the literature on hope. First, I review the literature that posits hope as a quality or attribute of persons 
that grows or shrinks depending on prevailing social conditions. Next, I review the literature that posits 
hope as a moral claim toward the future in a contemporary context marked by terrorism, global 
warming, a rapacious neoliberal capitalism, and socio-economic precarity. Finally, I review the 
literature that posits hope as a reorientation of knowledge that allows for the imagination and emergence 
of situations other than that which we are currently located in. Though I set these three bodies of 
knowledge off from one another for structural purposes, I should note that the writers referenced here 
continually cite one another despite their divergent theoretical and empirical commitments. I will thus 
aim to reproduce some of this dialogue. 
 
Hope and the Relational Subject 
To call hope a quality or attribute of persons is not to say that hope is an innate feature – or an essence 
– of the human subject. Indeed, hope as an orientation toward the future grows and shrinks in response 
to prevailing social conditions and thus hinges on interactions and interlocutions with particular 
historical, political-economic, and social regimes and relationships. The dimensions of these 
 
16 Per Crapanzano (2003), notable early examples would include R.R. Marett's Faith, Hope, and Charity in 
Primitive Society (1932), Ernest Bloch's The Principle of Hope (1986), and Henri Desroche's Sociology of Hope 
(1980). 
17 Hirokazu Miyazaki’s The Method of Hope (2004), for example, owes a major debt to Ernest Bloch’s work. 
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interactions and interlocutions come in multiple forms: they can be as great as the relationship between 
the state and the political subject, or as intimate as the relationship between the subject and their own 
body, and what that body is, can do, or can offer. Therefore, despite the impression of hope as a feature 
that is lodged in the individual body and psyche, it is instead, as I show below, a product of relationality, 
a precipitate of what it means to move through the world as a human being.  
 Crapanzano (2003) elaborates this argument, firstly, with reference to fieldwork conducted 
among white South Africans at the end of Apartheid, and secondly, via a close reading of Kenelm 
Burridge’s ethnography of the cargo cult, Mambo: A Melanesian Millennium (1995). In the first 
account, hope “is the field of desire in waiting,” (Crapanzano, 1985: 45) and emerges as an ambivalent 
affective response to a dying political system and the anticipated, but opaque and perhaps malevolent, 
dispensation that is expected to follow it. In the second, hope is both a response to European 
colonisation, as well as a transformation of a desire for European goods into ritual practice. Although 
hope arises as a passive undertaking in the former account (via waiting) and an active undertaking in 
the latter (via ritual), in both instances it is wrought by people's engagements with the legacy of 
colonialism.  
 Moving forward in time, Hage (2003, 2009) argues for the recognition of the unequal 
distribution of hope in Australian society, with hope consisting of collective visions of a meaningful 
and dignified life within that context. Inspired by Bourdieu’s (1979) work in colonial Algeria,18 Hage 
highlights how unequal social and economic processes produce and distribute temporal dispositions, 
such as hope. He, therefore, illustrates how the Australian state proffers the possibility of upward socio-
economic mobility and the notion of “going somewhere in life”, even as it leaves large sections of the 
population marginal and precarious, and thus with little hope and feelings of “stuckedness” (Hage, 
2009: 97). Hope (and its absence) is thus shaped by the relationship between the state and its subjects, 
arising not as a discrete affect or disposition, but as a response to a certain mode of governmentality.  
 
18 Bourdieu's (1979) work in colonial Algeria can be described as a “political-economy of hope” (Kleist and 
Jansen, 2016) insofar as it analyses how hope is distributed based on people's relative position within a particular 
social, political, or economic context. In seeking to understand how and what people hope for within a particular 
social constellation, it also usefully highlights affect and temporality, since different subject-positions will 
produce different affective and temporal dispositions. 
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 Such responses are detected into another, and perhaps more intimate, context by Reed (2011). 
Focusing on inmates in a Papua New Guinean prison awaiting legal judgment, he argues that wetkot 
(i.e. those on remand) are hopeful “not so much by disposition as by situation” and that hope is “less a 
condition of human persons and more a kind of force or power” (Reed, 2011: 533). He notes how wetkot 
do not work to keep hope alive, but rather see it as a necessary condition of being on remand, one 
continually thrust upon them by wardens, other convicts, legal representatives, and friends and relatives. 
This lays in contrast to the experiences of inmates who have already been sentenced, and who thus seem 
to have been abandoned by hope. Hope is therefore claimed or disavowed as an orientation toward the 
future depending on the social matrices in which subjects are situated in.  
 Similarly, experiences and practices of hope vis-a-vis health, illness, and the body also emerge 
within the context of a vast network of social relations. Good, Good, Schaffer, and Lind (1990: 60) 
argue that the hopes of patients, family caregivers, and clinicians often “articulate … with a society's 
cultural interpretation of hope”. This suggests that metanarratives about optimism and the future can 
give shape to patient-clinician and patient-caregiver understandings and discussions about hope. This, 
however, can be a burden if people adopt a hopeful stance only because it is socially required, or if they 
do so in the face of a grim prognosis or an illness or disability that is chronic or incurable (Antelius, 
2007; Mattingly, 2010). Hope is thus shaped by and circulates among various subjects, even when only 
employed to make sense of and respond to the physical changes or deterioration of an individual body.  
 In sum, the literature cited above usefully makes the case for viewing hope as an attribute of 
persons, but one that is produced in relation to the social matrices within which people exist in the 
world. As an orientation toward the future, hope is thus not so much an effect of individual wilfulness, 
but an outcome of interactions with history, contemporary forms of governmentality, specific 
institutions, such as the prison or the hospital, and specific situations, such as illness. One of the 
advantages of this literature lies in its contention that hope, as an affective practice, is not constant, but 
rather grows and shrinks and thus changes alongside the social relations that gave rise to it in the first 
place. This is one of the underlying assumptions of theorists who view hope as a political claim needed 




Hope in the Face of Horror 
The idea that hope is an antidote to conditions indisposed to human flourishing has a long social, 
political, and intellectual history. From Christianity to The Communist Manifesto, hope has been a 
hallmark of the interregnum between what-is and what-might-be. Moreover, in the social sciences, the 
notion of ‘hope in the face of horror’ can often be traced, albeit implicitly, in accounts of agency and 
resistance.19 In anthropology, for example, ethnographic inquiry has long been marshalled to look for 
‘hopeful moments’ in conditions where people live under state-led or historically-given forms of 
violence and oppression. The literature I review below, however, goes one step further. In a global 
context marked by crisis and uncertainty, these authors argue that hope is so scarcely distributed that 
assuming a hope stance toward the future is a moral claim and an assertion of a certain kind of 
progressive politics. 
 In their review of the aforementioned literature, Kleist and Jansen argue that it emerges out of 
“a widespread sense of crisis and a heightened sense of lack of political and ideological direction in this 
situation” (2017: 374). They highlight a range of events that have contributed to this, including global 
terror attacks (9/11, the London bombings), responses to those terror attacks (the War on Terror and its 
military interventions), new terrorist movements (Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, ISIS), violent natural 
disasters (earthquakes in El Salvador and Haiti, the Indian Ocean Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina), possible 
pandemics (H1N1, Ebola), the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the European migrant crisis of 2015, 
and so on. Kleist and Jansen (2017) caution, however, by saying that the world has not necessarily 
become more precarious, crisis-ridden, or uncertain, but rather that public debate and media discourse 
has “framed”20 it as such.  
 
19 See Ortner (1995) for a discussion on the use of the category of “resistance” in and outside anthropology. 
20 Kleist and Jansen's use of the notion of “framing” is drawn from Judith Butler's work on the frames of war 
(2009). Frames are ideas that fashion a shared understanding of events and conditions and offer a common - 
though by no means uncontested - lens for interpretation and representation. Frames are “productive, shaping 
interpretations of reality, and they are politically saturated” (Kleist and Jansen, 2016: 374). It is important to 
recognise that frames are socially constructed, not only to get a clearer sense of the undeclared interests which 
often underwrite them, as Kleist and Jansen (2016) point out, but also to grasp at what they obscure or displace. 
An emphasis on precarity and vulnerability as recent socio-political forms, for example, erases the centuries of 
precarity and vulnerability experienced by Black and First Nations people as a result of colonialism, genocide, 
and slavery from the fifteenth century onward. My thanks to Kharnita Mohamed for this insight. 
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 Whatever the world’s actual ontological status in this regard, a wide range of social theorists 
have contributed to a debate on hope that follows this line of thinking. One strain of this work centres 
on a need for hope in critical theory and progressive politics in the face of these crises and uncertainties 
(Ahmed, 2004; Brown, 1999; Buck-Morss, 2000; Harvey, 2000; Lowe, 2001; Zournazi, 2003), while 
another focuses more specifically on the changing nature of capitalism and the insecurities it gives rise 
to (Berlant, 2011; Brown, 2015; Guyer, 2007; Williams, 1989), while yet another sets its attention on 
hope in the context of specific conflicts, social inequalities, and transformations (Cooper and Pratten, 
2015; Jansen, 2013; Johnson-Hanks, 2005; Narotzky and Besnier, 2014). For all these theorists, hope 
is an orientation toward the future laden with political implications, given a contemporary moment 
marked by social and economic precarity.  
 The necessity for hope is highlighted firstly for its ability, however piecemeal, to bring 
alternative political futures into view. In this sense, the accounts offered by many of the authors noted 
above dovetail with the later return of hope to politics, as seen, for example, in Barack Obama’s 2008 
presidential campaign and its slogan “Yes We Can”, the Arab Spring movements in 2010, the global 
Occupy movements in 2011, and South Africa’s own #MustFall movements in 2015. The necessity of 
hope is highlighted on another score for its oblique relation to capitalism itself, since if the speculative, 
hopeful, spirit is part of contemporary financial capitalism, then undoing capitalism’s ruin will also 
require a speculative, hopeful, spirit (Harvey, 2000; Gibson-Graham, 2006; Tsing, 2015). Hope and the 
projects it births (be they theoretical or activist) is thus an antidote to the very conditions which instigate 
hopelessness in the first place.  
 Nevertheless, at the same time as recognising the usefulness of hope to progressive politics and 
social theory, many theorists in this literature also recognise its disadvantages, or at least its links to 
efforts and ideas inimical to a healthier and more prosperous future. Berlant (2011) calls this “cruel 
optimism”, in other words, affective attachments to, or hopes and desires for, projects, objects, or 
relations that might actually serve as an obstacle to one’s flourishing. An example of this is the 
modernist metanarrative of progress and its promise of “improvement” (Li, 2007). It has shaped many 
a political imaginary and people’s understandings of temporality, animating their hopes and dreams and 
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turning them into “conscripts of modernity” (Scott, 2004), even as it offers ever-decreasing returns 
(Ferguson, 1999), especially in a global context marked by greater needs and fewer and fewer resources.  
 In sum, the literature cited above makes the case for viewing hope as an orientation toward the 
future with moral and political underpinnings and required for a contemporary world marked by 
instability and uncertainty, especially vis-à-vis a rapacious neoliberal capitalism, increasing global 
warming, and the continuation of forms of oppression rooted in identity. Hope is here not only the locus 
of human agency but a practical endeavour through which to resist and undo the systems and processes 
which, following Hage (2003), distribute hope unevenly in the first instance. In other words, this 
literature asserts that hope, as an affective practise, can stimulate speculative attempts to “live 
otherwise” (Povinelli, 2011) and in this way bring alternative futures and lifeworlds into view. This is 
one of the key tenets of theorists who posit hope as a method that reorientates knowledge, literature I 
review in the following section. 
 
Hope as a Method of Knowledge Formation 
If the orthodox way of apprehending hope has been as an object of analysis, then the shift to hope-as-
method holds several consequences. The first of these is that hope is no longer viewed only as an affect 
or emotion, or even a positive sense of expectation. The second is that hope is not assumed to have any 
predetermined locus, purpose, or end-goal. The third, and perhaps most important, is that hope is no 
longer simply something social theorists analyse, but rather something that is part-and-parcel of their 
own practice. The literature I review below thus makes the argument that hope-as-method is something 
social theorists either should do or already do and that the consequences of this is not only a shift in our 
understanding of what hope is or might be but also a contribution to epistemological renewal and 
alternative ways of doing anthropology and social theory.  
 Miyazaki (2004) brings the philosophy of Bloch (1986) into conversation with his ethnographic 
study of the land claims of the Savavou people in Fiji to argue that hope is a method of knowledge 
formation. He analyses how hope is utilised by Bloch as a technique with which to understand the 
shortcomings of Western metaphysics. Likewise, he examines how hope is used by the Savavou people 
as a way of cultivating knowledge of the self in the face of forms of governmentality that denies their 
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history. In uniting these different forms of knowledge formation which on their surface seem radically 
dissimilar, Miyazaki argues that hope is the common method through which actors are able to come to 
terms with their present moment of not knowing, reorientate their knowledge, and through this propel 
themselves forward to a search for an alternative, the “not-yet” that Bloch (1986) argues lay beyond the 
limits of our knowledge. 
  Later, Miyazaki (2006) points out that social theorists have been using hope-as-method without 
explicitly stating it as such, or perhaps even recognising it as such. Comparing the hopes of Japanese 
finance traders with theorists immersed in critiques of capitalism, he shows how hope-as-method 
operates in both groups, despite their differing epistemological, ideological, and material positions. This 
is because hope is what enables them to reorientate their knowledge and search for alternatives at the 
very moment at which their knowledge has failed them – such as when a trader’s deal does not come to 
fruition, or a theorist’s critique of capitalism is no longer effective to political organising. Once this 
reorientation has taken place, new forms of knowledge, practice, and ways of doing are sought and 
cultivated, whether new technologies and approaches in finance or new forms of critique.  
 Miyazaki’s (2004, 2006) notion that hope-as-method reorientates one’s knowledge and propels 
one toward searching for alternatives not yet borne dovetails with Appadurai’s (2004; 2013) argument 
that a focus on the future might reinvent anthropology and its key concept, culture, through a focus on 
people “capacities to aspire”.  It also resonates with Sedgwick’s (2004) repudiation of “paranoid theory” 
(i.e. theory that either claims to know everything in advance or treat everything as an opportunity to 
perform what Paul Ricoeur has called ‘the hermeneutics of suspicion’) through its openness toward 
uncertainty. And finally, it connects with Stewart’s (2007) call for an understanding of the social world 
that is not static and authoritative, but attuned to ongoing ordinary processes, moments, and turns that 
might escape our orthodox analytical frameworks and routine ways of theorising and writing. Hope-as-
method is thus entwined with efforts that beckon new and different kinds of intellectual 
experimentation.  
 Such efforts, Miyazaki (2004) points out, will allow us to produce concepts that are 
commensurate with our interlocutors’ own analytics, such as his notion of “replication” drawn from 
Savavou practices. This is because the openness that hope-as-method foregrounds is predicated on the 
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suspension of a commitment to the anthropological canon in order to find other ways of describing and 
analysing the world. It thus also has resonances with what has recently been called “recursive 
anthropology” (Holbraad, 2012) and “the ontological turn” (Holbraad and Pederson, 2017), where the 
anthropologist’s only a priori is their commitment to having no a prioris, and ethnographic materials 
are not only meant to be described and analysed but also employed to alter the very terms of 
anthropological inquiry, especially in those instances where the tools of anthropological inquiry cannot 
do justice to the ethnographic materials (Holbraad, 2017: 275). 
 In sum, the literature reviewed above views hope as a method of knowledge production and 
scholarly renewal. Hope, it argues, is what allows us to reorientate our knowledge toward the unknown 
and “not-yet” and through this not only apprehend our current ways of knowing as faltering, but also 
search for alternatives with both a sense of potentiality and uncertainty, and then experiment with 
different forms of understanding the world through the forms of analysing, theorising, and writing we 
employ. Hope’s tentative yet forward-looking stance is thus honoured, and it is not simply understood 
as an outcome of past processes or contemporary regimes, or necessarily usable only for a particular 
kind of critique, but rather applicable to a range of different endeavours, political and intellectual 
projects, and social contexts. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the different ways in which hope as an orientation toward the future 
has been deployed in anthropology specifically and the social sciences more generally. This work has 
followed three paths. The first focuses on hope as an outcome of social relations, one that shrinks and 
grows depending on prevailing social conditions and relationships. The second focuses on hope as an 
orientation needed to strengthen progressive politics and counter the social, political, and economic 
conditions that are inimical to human flourishing. The third and final focusses on hope as a method of 
knowledge, as something that reorientates our current way of knowing and provides directionality 
toward other epistemological positions. On all three accounts, the focus on hope is processual, not 
categorial, asking not what hope is but what it does, what worlds and understandings of worlds it allows 
us to imagine and bring into being.  
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 The four ethnographic chapters that follow will situate my project at the intersection of all three 
the abovementioned approaches but will attempt to move them in other directions. Firstly, I will argue 
that hope is not only produced by past or prevailing social relations but can also be read as an index of 
those social relations, a place where a cluster of histories, intimacies, and socio-political processes 
congregate and are then marshalled to bring a futural ‘otherwise’ into being. Secondly, I will indicate 
that hope, contra its use in some Marxist (Harvey, 2000) and feminist (Ahmed, 2004) analyses, is not 
inherently positive or usable for progressive politics, given that it is vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the 
social world and can also be invested in projects that do not or cannot ensure individual and collective 
flourishing. And finally, I will indicate that hope does offer a method of knowledge formation, but one 
that more fruitfully tells us about how social life is currently structured and organised, rather than what 
it might or ought to be.  
 My arguments rest on an examination of how hope exists in specific times and places, rather 
than the assumption that it is the same across contexts. It counters the tendency to view hope as 
uniformly positive or expedient by showing its entanglement with projects that may revivify, rather 
than contest, orthodox social norms and arrangements. It illustrates that hope is both an outcome of 
prior conditions (and thus connected to the past) and attendant to action and the building of an otherwise 
(and thus oriented toward the future).  And finally, it reveals how hope not only reorientates knowledge, 
but also enables other reorientations that contribute to individual and social transformation. Like 
Crapanzano (2003), my aim across the following ethnographic chapters is to point toward and further 










An Archive of Longings 
 
Introduction 
How do former worlds shape the style or substance of prospective worlds and in what ways do such 
processes shift across time and space? In this chapter, I perform a comparative analysis between the 
hopes of two of my interlocutors and Stef Jansen’s Yearnings in the Meantime (2017), an ethnography 
of desires for “normal lives” in post-socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina. My basis for comparison is 
yearnings for what Jansen describes as “ordinary objects”, namely, items, institutions, and relations that 
are imagined to be commonplace entities but are in fact, in contexts of structural deprivation, highly 
unobtainable. My juxtaposition here of societies that are geographically dispersed and materially 
disparate should not indicate a comparative analysis in search of origins, nor an engagement with some 
obscene notion of “progress”. Rather, what I want to do is to surface how both our interlocutors’ hopes 
reveal the specifics of place and the workings of power across disparate contexts. 
 Jansen argues that his interlocutors’ desires for “normality” emerge out of their reflections on 
life as lived before the Bosnian War in the 1990s, reflections which then generate certain aspirations 
for the future. This is akin to what I perceived in my own fieldwork, namely, the notion that former 
lifeworlds informed the hopes people had for the future. Where Jansen and my insights diverge, 
however, is that while his interlocutors view the past as a time in which they had “normal lives”, and 
thus a spatio-temporal zone which they hope to revivify in the future, my interlocutors held no such 
inclinations. Rather, their hopeful horizons often functioned as a sharp repudiation of the past, an 
affective mode that is, I argue, diagnostic of the specifics of South African place and history. The facts 
of colonialism and Apartheid, and their devasting material and emotional consequences for Black 
people, mean that the Black women in my study have no desire to craft a future that in any way mimics 
the past. 
 This is contra to Jansen’s white European research participants, for whom the pre-1990s 
socialist period was not a timespace always or only defined by violence, precarity, or meagre access to 
 
34 
resources and opportunities. The hopes delineated in both our ethnographic accounts are thus deeply 
revealing of the specifics of place. More pertinently, mine reveal histories of exclusion and deprivation 
that highlight continuities with the past, even as they also indicate a shift in some aspects of the structure 
of South African life. Included here is the “horizon of expectation” (Koselleck, 2004) inaugurated by 
post-1994 political freedom, the sense that opportunities are available, that one can access them and 
thus ascend the socio-economic ladder provided one has the skills and wits to do so. This bootstrap 
fantasy of self-authorizing freedom is, however, continually interrupted or deferred by intractable socio-
political and economic issues, and thus indexical of the workings of power in contemporary South 
Africa.  
 This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I provide an overview of Jansen’s 
Yearnings in the Meantime (2017), paying particular attention to his conceptualisation of “ordinary 
objects” and his use of the temporal markers “was”, “is”, and “ought” and the relation he highlights 
between the first and last of these terms. In the second and third sections, I turn to the hopes of my 
interlocutors Angela and Hlumile, respectively, and show how their hopeful experiences resonate with 
those highlighted by Jansen (2017), insofar as they collectively provide instances of hopes held for 
“ordinary objects” that are, in contexts of material scarcity, quite extraordinary. At the same time, 
however, I show how my interlocutors’ experiences diverge from those highlighted by Jansen, insofar 
as South African political history has rendered the past an entity to be repudiated, rather than, as in 
Jansen’s study, something people desire to revive.  
 
 “Was”, “Is”, “Ought”: Stef Jansen’s Yearnings in the Meantime 
In Yearnings in the Meantime (2017), the anthropologist Stef Jansen grapples with the question of hopes 
for “normal lives” and a “normal state” in a time and place when neither is available. Based on fieldwork 
conducted in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jansen’s ethnography illustrates that people often 
equate “normal lives” with the presence of state-provided infrastructure that is predictable, dependable, 
and accessible. People, therefore, desire “grids” of various kinds that suggest “normality” and allow 
them to “get on” with their lives – with “grids” here taken to refer to James C. Scott’s (1998) concept 
of the myriad ordering frameworks in modern society, from transport, to the monetary system, to 
 
35 
identity documentation. Because of the absence of a fully-functioning state, and thus the absence of 
these grids, people feel as though their lives are not normal or moving forward, alluding to the 
“stuckedness” Hage (2003) has written about elsewhere.  
 Jansen characterises this absence of hope and the feeling of malaise as “Daytonitis” or the 
“Dayton Meantime”, in reference to the Dayton Accords – a 1995 peace agreement reached near 
Dayton, Ohio in the United States, and signed in Paris, France a few months later – which put an end 
to the three-and-a-half-year Bosnian War, one of the Yugoslav wars that broke out in the aftermath of 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its allied Communist States. Although this agreement brought 
formal peace to the people of Sarajevo and the region more generally, the political and institutional 
formations it wrought did not bring about a bona fide material improvement in people’s lives. 
Continuing disagreements of the questions of statehood delayed the veritable production and 
distribution of statecraft, i.e. the policies and social projects that are indicative of “what the state does, 
claims to do, and should do,” (Jansen, 2017: 12).  
 Jansen aims to write against what he calls the “libertarian tradition” in anthropology, which he 
argues is exemplified by the work of James C. Scott and David Graeber and which is premised on an 
epistemology that holds the state to be inherently oppressive. He thus indicates that the end of the 
Bosnian War instituted a “horizon of anticipation” (Koselleck, 2004) in the people with whom he 
worked, one which compelled them to desire the state and state-based frameworks and institutions, 
rather than repudiate these as oppressive. Where Scott (1998), for example, might view the extension 
of state-based gridding practices and infrastructures as attempts by bureaucratic administrators to 
dominate the polity, Jansen instead argues that such gridded infrastructures are what enable a “normal 
life”, insofar as they allow, or provide the condition of possibility for, people to go about their everyday 
lives and routine practices.  
 Jansen provides two incisive examples with which to illustrate his argument. The first, in 
people’s frustration with the chaotic and unpredictable local transport system, and the second, in their 
attempts to maintain and continue the schooling of children during the Bosnian War. In both instances, 
he shows how, in the absence or breakdown of such forms of gridding (which would otherwise be state-
provided), the residents in Sarajevo with whom he worked exhibited a “grid desire”, a yearning for lives 
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calibrated by certain forms of institutionalised predictability. These forms thus not only provided the 
groundwork on which people could map their lives, daily routines, and hopes for the future, but also 
furnished them with the basis upon which they could mobilise their agentive capacities and craft the 
kinds of “normal lives” they desired.  
 Jansen further cites Fehérváry (2002) on the question of what counts as “ordinary” for those 
desiring “normal lives”. Fehérváry (2002: 370) argues that in much of the post-Soviet region, the 
objects, practices, and standards of living that are thought and spoken of as “ordinary” are, given the 
prevailing socio-political and material circumstances, quite extraordinary and “yet are imagined to be 
part of ‘average’ lifestyles in western Europe or the United States”. Jansen suggests that this equation 
of “normality” and the “ordinary” with the material and political conditions of Europe and the West is 
part of a broader desire in many post-Soviet states to (once again) belong to the political communities 
those words refer to and to be (re)integrated in “normal Western-capitalist” dynamics which are 
imagined as having been interrupted by the “abnormality” of Communism during much of the twentieth 
century. 
 At the same time, however, Jansen also points out that the desire to escape the “Dayton 
Meantime” and cultivate alternative futures did not entail a straightforward valorisation or reproduction 
of western European liberal democratic capitalism. He illustrates how many of his interlocutors yearned 
for an otherwise through a particular kind of temporal regime, premised on a “was”, “is”, and “ought”. 
The first (“was”) refers to life prior to the war, during the socialist period, when state-provided 
infrastructure and service delivery, whatever its quality, was regular and able to fulfil people’s basic 
needs. The second (“is”) refers to the prevailing socio-temporal conditions in which people are situated, 
and which they find wanting and in need of improvement. The final (“ought”) refers to people’s desires 
for normality, routine, and forms of statecraft upon which they can build their futures, desires which 
themselves have a relation to the past (“was”) because it is often figured as a return to when things were 
normal, routine, and when statecraft was provided. Jansen, therefore, illustrates that hopes for the future 
are both produced by a “horizon of anticipation” (Koselleck, 2004) instituted by a certain historical 
conjunction (post the Bosnian War), and entail a kind of backward-looking stance through which people 
understand what the good life is or ought to be.  
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Wanted: Ordinary Objects 
In the following paragraphs I want to take up one aspect of Jansen’s work, namely how hopes for 
“normal lives” entail the figuration of “ordinary” objects. Jansen notes early in his ethnography that his 
own fieldwork – and local research conducted by various other bodies, such as the media – illustrated 
that “most people wanted jobs, proper health care, a stop to crooked privatisation and other corruption, 
a fairer distribution of resources, quality education, a functioning administration, an effective judicial 
apparatus, and so on” (2017: 13). “Normal lives” are thus constitutive of a range of “ordinary” objects, 
even as the prevailing shape of socio-political life does not always or ever make these possible. It is this 
line of thinking that emerged in my own work and that I want to explore here.  
 When I visited Angela in October 2018, she wanted to get out of the house. Instead of her living 
room, which had served as our prior meeting space, she suggested we take a drive to Tygervalley 
Shopping Centre in Durbanville. There she and I did bits of shopping before sitting down for a late 
lunch at Ocean Basket.21 In the empty smoking section, she told me that things looked a lot less hopeful 
than our first interview (in April of that year). Back then she was still on an extended maternity leave, 
having “retired” from work and divested her pension from her prior place of employment, a major local 
medical aid company. The plan she and her husband had set out was that they would use this money to 
cover their debt, buy a few new household items, and allow her to spend at least one or two years at 
home as a stay-at-home mother with her new daughter Lindsay, given that she did not spend much time 
with her eldest son Andrew, then aged six, when he was a baby.  
 The reason for her lack of hope was that her husband was not, in the months between our first 
and last interview, able to secure a permanent, well-paying job, and was still working as a bookkeeper-
cum-inventory manager at his cousin’s garage. This was despite the fact that he had, a year prior, 
graduated with distinction with a degree from the UCT School of Business here in Cape Town. Given 
this, she had now had to return to working full-time since his salary at the garage would not be enough 
to sustain their family. Her frustration at his failure to secure better employment was thus compounded 
with her disappointment in having to leave her daughter and return to working full-time. Her hopes for 
 
21 A local chain of seafood restaurants. 
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her immediate future were shot, and the long-term future looked much more uncertain. It palpably 
affected her. “I’m just so tired,” she said. She felt like she could not catch a break.  
 For Angela, what constituted the “ordinary” was similar but different to what Jansen (2017) 
notes above. In our first interview, she had complained, “I just want to get out of this place,” referring 
to Bishop Lavis on the Cape Flats, where she has lived most of her life.22 She noted that her children 
cannot play outside because of rampant gang violence, the local library’s selection of texts is deficient, 
her son has to go to school thirty minutes away because local schools tend to perform poorly, and, 
perhaps most amusingly, if she wants Portobello mushrooms she has to drive twenty minutes to Parow, 
where the closest Pick ‘n Pay23 is located. She was thus, in essence, complaining about what it is like 
to live in a township, about its shortcomings, and its meagre resources and amenities. Her grievances 
suggest how Apartheid spatial planning and an unequal, trickle-down economy impinge on people and 
their ability to craft lives and futures in accordance with their ideals, desires, and aesthetic aspirations. 
 She and her husband had hoped that whatever employment he would find after his graduation 
would give him a pay-increase big enough to allow them to move out of their current home and 
neighbourhood, “maybe not somewhere fancy but at least somewhere where your neighbours aren’t 
constantly asking you for R10 for bread which they then use to buy beer”. This last comment is 
indicative of her location in an unpleasant gift economy, where hunger and alcoholism go side-by-side 
and she and her family, despite their own financial insecurity, are viewed as being financially 
comfortable and thus able to support others. Furthermore, her desires for a socio-spatial otherwise is 
interesting insofar as the things she lusts after, she asserted, should not be particularly extraordinary: a 
safe place for her children to play, a good school close to home, satisfactory amenities, and so on.  
 Like Jansen’s ethnography, Angela’s story thus suggests how an economy of scarcity operates 
– by foreclosing the realisation of fairly ordinary needs and desires, and by turning the benign, the 
bucolic, and the convenient into extraordinary objects that are within view but not within reach. Her 
hopes, therefore, resonate with some of the yearnings held by Jansen’s (2017) and Fehérváry’s (2002) 
 
22 Angela and her husband briefly rented a house in Ruyterwacht, a more well-off neighbourhood in another 
part of Cape Town. However, they moved back to Angela’s father’s home in Bishop Lavis when her husband 
enrolled at the UCT Business School, as they could not afford both their monthly rent and his tuition fees. 
23 A local chain of supermarkets. 
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interlocutors, insofar as they hold the ownership of or access to certain objects to be constitutive of 
“normal lives”. However, in the absence of such “ordinary objects” because of widespread material 
scarcity, lives are felt to be abnormal and thus temporarily “on hold” – a position that both alludes to 
Jansen’s designation of the Dayton Meantime, and Angela’s sense of stuckedness in the face of the 
collapse of her hope for upward mobility. Of course, the hopes of my interlocutors not only held echoes 
of those described by Jansen but also diverge from them, a divergence that reveals the specifically South 
African character of these hopes. 
 
Against The Past 
In his ethnography, Jansen (2017) fleshes out a temporal regime premised, as noted earlier, on “was”, 
“is”, and “ought”, indicating that people’s hopes for the future often entailed a kind of backward-
looking stance that seeks to revivify the past, since this was the time during which people had “normal 
lives”. In my own fieldwork, this kind of temporalisation also emerged, but in a different way. Although 
my interlocutors reflected on the past, they did not deploy it as an image through which they could 
sketch a future alternative to the present. Instead, the past was repudiated and prospective futures were 
almost always conceived as its opposite. This is diagnostic, I argue, of the damaging effects colonialism 
and the Apartheid system had on Black South Africans, and why the Black women in my study have 
no desire to craft a future that in any way mimics the past. This came through most clearly in the story 
of my interlocutor Hlumile, who wanted to get her daughter into a private all-girls’ school.  
 Through most of 2018, she would update me about her struggle to get her daughter into her 
school of choice for first grade in 2019. She and her husband’s preferred school was a private all-girl’s 
school in the Southern Suburbs here in Cape Town.24 They applied there and at three other schools. Her 
daughter was rejected by all of them. She immediately called around, asking what was wrong, why her 
 
24 The school Hlumile was interested in sending her daughter to is one of the top performing schools in the city 
and the country, and thus an institutional rarity. Like other schools of its kind, it is located in an affluent suburb 
that was declared a whites-only residential district by the Apartheid government and therefore primarily catered 
to white students. In the post-Apartheid, however, the school and others like it have enrolled aspirant middle-
class Black students, although transformation of institutional cultures tend to be slow. The furore over Black 




daughter did not get admitted, often to be told that it was because the girl “didn’t make the criteria”. 
When Hlumile would call and ask what the “criteria” was, she would be met with partial and often half-
baked answers. She then called the Western Cape Education Department (WCED), the local schooling 
authority, to inquire as to what could be done: her daughter had fulfilled most, sometimes all, of the 
requirements for the schools they had applied for yet could not get admitted. “What am I supposed to 
do?” she asked me rhetorically, “Send my daughter to school in Khayelitsha or Gugulethu even though 
we live in Mowbray?”25 
 One afternoon in September 2018, she personally visited their first-choice school and was told 
yet another story: her daughter was on the waiting list. “It didn’t make sense because we submitted the 
application long before the final due date.” A former colleague of hers whose daughter is already 
enrolled at the school, and who serves on the governing body, let her in on a secret: she and a few other 
parents had formed a group that was petitioning against the school’s prevailing admissions practices, 
since these were often premised forms of racism and class elitism. As Hlumile said: “Apparently a lot 
of it is about how much you earn, who you are and what your title is [for example, Dr, Prof, and so on], 
who you know, whether you’re white or not. They don’t like black South Africans, but they’ll take 
blacks from other parts of the continent”. 
 What I want to highlight here is not the reasons why (or why not) her daughter did not gain 
entry to the school. It is perfectly reasonable for a prestigious all-girls school to have a highly selective, 
and thus exclusionary, admissions process. In the same way, in a racist society like South Africa it is 
also reasonable to assume that a school which has historically catered to the daughters of the white 
upper classes would put in place measures, albeit clandestine, to maintain and reproduce white privilege 
and class elitism. What I want to highlight, rather, is how Hlumile’s hope to get her daughter into this 
school is premised on the assumption that entry into such a school would be a run-of-the-mill 
endeavour, that applying to and attending it would be an “ordinary” activity, requiring only her 
daughter’s competency and her own logistical efficacy; in other words, a straightforward meritocracy. 
 
25 Khayelitsha and Gugulethu are townships on the Cape Flats historically inhabited by black Africans. In drawing 
a distinction between these locations and Mowbray – a whites-only suburb under Apartheid – Hlumile is calling 
attention to the racist logic that would figure these locations as the “proper” places for her family to live and 
her daughter to attend school. 
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Like Angela before her, what she imagines to be “ordinary”, what she hopes could be “normal” is, in 
light of histories of racial and economic exclusion, extraordinary and thus deeply unobtainable. 
 When I asked Hlumile why she would go through the trouble of getting her daughter into her 
first choice school – given the accusations of racism and class elitism levelled against it – she told me 
that she wanted her daughter to attend the school not only for the formal education it offered but also 
for the kinds of social and cultural capital she imagined her daughter would gain by attending such as 
school. She invoked the saying “the world is your oyster”, noting that she wanted her daughter to have 
a “larger understanding” about what the world contains and the possibilities it holds. “You work at a 
university,” she told me, “you’ve seen those private school kids. They’re so confident because they 
know nothing is unreachable”.  
 Furthermore, her hope that the school could be a route to an alternative future also hinges on 
her own past experiences. She reflected, during one interview, on how her first visit overseas was met 
with applause and adulation by her family, similar to what she received when she got into university, 
the first person in her family to do so. “It was such a big thing,” she said, “they wanted to slaughter a 
cow.26 Our social media was blowing up, Whatsapp was blowing up, and that’s because we never saw 
these things as being reachable, as being attainable. And I don’t want that for my daughters. I want 
them to know what possibilities are available to them.” Her hopes communicate a desire to be ordinary 
and undistinguished, given that the shape and form of the local political economy have rendered her 
experiences so exceptional, made her an outlier rather than the norm. It is thus indicative of how, under 
Apartheid, economic possibilities and upward mobility were curtailed for Black people and how, 
despite changes in political power post-1994, this kind of economic oppression perdures into the 
present. 
 If Jansen’s (2017) interlocutors seek to craft a future that mirrors the past, Hlumile’s story here 
operates as a repudiation of the past, since it was a time-space in which the life-chances afforded to a 
woman such as herself were so horribly slender. The hopes she has for her daughters’ futures therefore 
both emerge from a reflection on the past and stand in opposition to it, a stance that seeks to beckon an 
 
26 A ritual of thanks. 
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alternative future by engaging in particular kinds of labour in the present. What is more, her hope to get 
her daughter into the school, and the impossibility of that hope, is revealing of how inequality in 
contemporary South Africa works: forms of transformation collide with old hierarchies, racist logics 
are revivified in new forms, and the institutions white privilege underwrites are morally disavowed and 
yet pragmatically lusted after. Like Angela, what she imagines to be “ordinary” and what she hopes 
could be “normal” is instead rendered extraordinary or exceptional by a social world in which upward 
mobility for Black people cannot be taken for granted or assumed in advance. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I brought the hopes of my interlocutors Angela and Hlumile into conversation with Stef 
Jansen’s Yearnings in the Meantime (2017), an ethnography of desires for “normal lives” in post-
socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina. I illustrated that there are resonances between the stories that 
emerged in my fieldwork and those discovered by Jansen, insofar as both our interlocutors have desires 
for particular kinds of objects, institutions, and relations that they hope will generate for them a “normal 
life”. At the same time, however, I illustrated that while Jansen’s research participants desire a future 
that in some ways mimic the form and content of the past, mine do not. This is the result, I argue, of the 
fact that for the Black women in my research the past is so much defined by the presence of deprivation 
that it can only be opposed and repudiated, rather than reinhabited. The hopes I delineate here are 
therefore indexical of forms of power and inequality in contemporary South Africa, especially in their 
manifestation as spatial and racialised inequality. In the following chapter, I engage with the ways in 
which hopes are not simply orientated toward more abundant futures, but are also brought to bear on 
what I call “normative objects”, relations and things who’s social and material value are imagined to 








(Normative) Objects of Desire 
 
Introduction 
Over much of the last century, anthropologists, feminist, and queer theorists have continually examined 
and critiqued the heteropatriarchal nuclear family as a means to both render it relative and contingent 
and to indicate its capacity to serve as a site of oppression for women and queer people. This effort has 
correctly pointed out that the universalisation of this particular notion of the family not only prevents 
us from understanding other affinal relations on their own terms, but also contributes to socio-political 
discourses which delimit what forms of intimacy count as legitimate and thus worthy of state protection, 
recognition, or assistance. But what would it do to hold off on that critique for a moment and set our 
attention on why people might invest in normative notions of kinship and home, even as their status as 
hegemonic entities mean that they are capable of exclusion and domination? What would it reveal about 
the entanglement of gender, sexuality, property, and the work of survival in precarious contexts? 
 In this chapter, I argue that critiques of normative objects such as heterosexual marriage and 
private property often forget that some people have not always been able to inhabit these social forms, 
and so the investment in them, in fact, offers them the opportunity to refurnish these entities as generous, 
rather than oppressive, spaces. Drawing on the hopes of my interlocutors Rachel and Thandiwe, I 
illustrate how their attachment to particular notions of family and home perform what I call ‘reparative 
work’. This is because such attachments allow them to craft more stable and materially abundant futures 
for their children. They undertake these projects in the face of their imbrication with personal histories 
of displacement, violence, and abandonment, and more prior socio-political arrangements that are 
inimical to Black family life and the cultivation of loving and stable kinship forms. 
 Their efforts, therefore, suggest that the desire for normative objects comes into being precisely 
because it provides people with an occasion to inhabit particular kinds of intimacies which they might 
not have had access to before. This is especially so in a context like South Africa, where normative 
prescriptions of what family life is or should look like have gone hand-in-hand with a political-economy 
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that makes it impossible for people to live up to such ideals. In crafting an attentiveness to the logic of 
why people might pin their hopes on, and make themselves subject to, such hegemonic forms, I thus 
further indicate the need to simultaneously keep love and self-interest, or the emotional form and the 
property form, in our analytic purview. The hopes delineated here are thus indexical not only of 
normative notions of “the good life” as these relate to kinship, but also diagnostic of the constellation 
of histories, socio-economic processes, and intimate desires that enable the investment in such notions 
in the first place. 
 This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I provide a brief overview of 
some anthropological writing on kinship, sexuality, and domesticity and bring these into conversation 
with my interlocutor Rachel’s hopes for her relationship with her boyfriend Pieter. In the second section, 
I turn to the notion of “reparative work”, emphasising how the effects of settler colonialism on Black 
family life has inaugurated subsequent desires, as evinced by the hopes of my interlocutor Thandiwe, 
to reinvest family and private property with new, and possibly more just and caring, meanings. In the 
third and final section, I provide further insight into the connection between the making of family and 
the structure of the political-economy, indicating that my interlocutors’ hopes often conjoin the two, 
thus collapsing the commonsensical division between affect and material property. 
 
The Nuclear Family: A Fantasy 
If earlier anthropological accounts of the family insisted on its universality (Malinowski, 1913), 
subsequent practitioners of the discipline have vigorously contested such notions as ethnocentric, 
particularly in their manifestation as common-sense understandings of kinship, home, and intimacy. 
Think of Radcliffe-Brown’s (1940) delineation of ritualised “joking relationships” among different 
generations in Africa, or Weston’s (1990) examination of forms of alternative kin-making among queer 
groups in North America, or Howell’s (2006) account of the processes through which transnational 
adoptees (in)formally become members of their adopted families in Europe. In these texts and others, 
anthropologists have demonstrated globally the diverse modes through which people know and 
actualise notions of affinity, and thus unsettle assumptions that there is only one way in which to 
understand and construct the form and content of one’s relatedness to others.  
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 In our context and elsewhere, however, the heteropatriarchal nuclear family has often perdured 
as the normative mode of organising kinship and belonging. In other words, despite the empirical fact 
that what constitutes a “family” or “home” is frequently an assemblage of actors who may relate to one 
another in various biological and non-biological ways, social and political ideas about what the familial 
is, might, or should be, often “consecrate families only of certain substantive kinds, and they leave the 
rest abject,” (Faubion, 2010: 10). Attempts to value the heteropatriarchal nuclear family above all others 
was a common feature of the colonial enterprise and its violent imposition of Eurocentric notions of the 
kinship (Amadiume, 2005; Stoler, 2001). It also continues in instances where contemporary nation-
states politicise family, domesticity, and sexuality, and delimit which versions of these categories count 
as legitimate and thus worthy of state protection and recognition (Berlant, 1997; Mody, 2008; Povinelli, 
2006). My point is not that the heteropatriarchal nuclear family is natural, universal, inevitable or ideal, 
but rather that it has been presented as such by various, and often overlapping, institutions and 
discursive regimes.27 
 The idealisation of this particular version of the family certainly occurred in my fieldwork. One 
afternoon at Rachel’s house, as she was pouring orange juice for her sons, she began telling me about 
the “fantastic” weekend she had just spent with Pieter, her current boyfriend, and, she hoped, her future 
husband and father to her sons. They had met in 2010 when she worked as a cleaner at a bottling 
company in Epping, where he worked as one of the delivery men. She was standing at the kiosk during 
lunchtime one day, keen on buying a can of Fanta, but was R2 short. She asked him, the nearest person 
she could find, and he gallantly stepped in and bought the can for her. “We started talking and then 
ended up having lunch together most days,” she said, “of course I stopped working there after a few 
 
27 I should point out that even in instances when adherence to the model of the nuclear family is not explicitly 
demanded, certain precepts about what kinds of intimate relations matter, and how, often permeate the realm 
of the political, such as in the delivery of social goods like public housing. Ross (2010), for example, illustrates 
how the post -1994 state’s application process for public housing in Cape Town was able to accommodate the 
diverse kin relations South Africa’s colonial and Apartheid history has produced, and yet still might have been 
underpinned by ideas about duration and temporal coherence that assume the presence of a stable nuclear 
family over time. Not only did this assumption have the effect of obscuring the complexity of people’s actual 
relationships, it also induced a kind of moral panic as people attempted to nucleate and stabilise the fluidity of 
their kin relations, such as through marriage, in the hope that it might aid them in acquiring housing or securing 
housing subsidies (Ross, 2010: 82-87). 
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weeks – you know how I hate cleaning – and then we lost contact.” They met again in December 2017, 
at a friend of a friend’s braai28 in Elsies River, and “[they’ve] been together ever since.” 
 Their first and second meetings, of course, premised one key difference: the second time around 
she was a single mother of three children, her former partners and fathers to her children either dead or 
absent. He seemed, nevertheless, entirely unfazed by this, a quality that served as one of her key 
attractions to him. “He’s a good man,” she said, “there aren’t a lot of men who’d take on a woman with 
three children. He takes care of us, gives me money when I need it for myself or the children, buys 
groceries. We were at Fruit & Veg City29 last week and he bought a bunch of stuff – meat, potatoes, 
onions, rice, that kind of thing, stuff you need around the house. I’m very grateful.” And there is more: 
“he likes to drink, likes to have a good time. This weekend, for example, we braaied at his house and 
bought a crate of Black Label [beer]. We listened to the Bee Gees, which I didn’t like, but he liked 
because he likes that old music. It was really nice.” 
 Her hope, as I mentioned earlier, is that their relationship will lead to marriage. When I had 
asked her the previous week what one thing she would still like to accomplish she said it was to be 
married. “It looks so nice, you know? I was a bridesmaid in Poppie’s [her friend] wedding last month 
and it was so beautiful. And when I see Janine and Joshua when they visit Auntie Carol30 I think to 
myself, ‘I want that’. I want to feel what’s it like to be married. To be married and have my own house, 
and car, and children. To live separately and not be dependent on my family. To live a respectable life.” 
To this end, she is very concerned about pleasing Pieter and making their relationship flow as smoothly 
as possible. “I always make sure I am available to him. I’m not working right now, so it’s easy. And I 
always make sure we have a good time”. 
 Her desire for the ideal nuclear family, and her affective and temporal investment in her 
relationship with Pieter as a means to manifest this, is an instantiation of normative notions of kinship 
and intimacy as these take shape within local social worlds. The sentimentalisation of marriage we see 
in her discussion of Janine and Joshua is also symptomatic of this. So, too, is the assertion that she 
 
28 Barbeque 
29 A local chain of supermarkets.  
30 Auntie Carol is a neighbour of ours, Janine and Joshua are her daughter and son-in-law, respectively. 
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“always makes she she’s available to him,” which, in our discussion that day, sounded less like equal 
partners grappling with the logistics of their relationship and more like a woman shaping her life in 
accordance with her male partner’s schedule. The affective investments Rachel is making in this 
relationship thus offers a road to contentment that could ultimately turn out to be a form of “cruel 
optimism” (Berlant, 2011), given that what seems to be a pathway to the good life might not, in fact, 
lead to her long-term personal flourishing, or at least not satisfy the fantasies of family and home that 
she places so much value onto. 
 
Reparative Work 
Nevertheless, the otherwise admirable task of critiquing normative notions of kinship forgets that 
people might invest in them precisely because they have not always been able to inhabit such forms. 
Black feminists have long pointed this out vis-à-vis the feminist project as a whole: bell hooks (1983), 
for example, critiques the second-wave feminist argument that home and family are oppressive to 
women because it does not allow them to fully make use of their productive capacities and that it might 
more fruitful for them to exit the home and enter the workforce. Although sympathetic to this argument 
in the first instance, hooks nonetheless points out that histories of slavery, colonialism, and segregation 
have often prevented Black families from cultivating stable and loving kinship forms, and so the 
commitment to building family might ultimately be a fulfilling, rather than oppressive, endeavour. 
 This is especially the case in South Africa, where white settler colonialism not only imposed 
Eurocentric notions of the family that pathologized the diverse kinship forms Black people themselves 
composed, but also instituted a political-economy that, in fact, made it impossible for them to live up 
to the ideals that colonial moral authorities proffered. Labour relations from slavery through the colonial 
era generated various kinds of dislocation that devastated the possibility of crafting stable kinship forms 
(Worden, 2014; Hall and Posel, 2019). These modes of displacement were extended through 
Apartheid's segregationist policies and practice of forced removals. They were also reproduced in the 
enactment of particular kinds of laws, such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, the 
Immorality Act of 1950, and the Population Registration Act of 1950. These laws not only separated 
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family members with different phenotypical features but also made it difficult for mixed-race couples 
and their offspring to live together as coherent family units (Sherman and Steyn, 2009; Ratele, 2009). 
 It is these histories, and their attendant experiences of trauma, that occasion contemporary 
investments in normative objects such as the nuclear family. This was clear with my interlocutor 
Thandiwe, who had a very itinerant childhood, moving back-and-forth between the homes of her mother 
in Swellendam and her paternal grandmother here in Cape Town. “My parents split up when I was four; 
they got into a fight and my father attacked my mother with an axe, took her left arm right off. She still 
wears a prosthetic.” Her mother became dependent on alcohol after this and her father drifted off – into 
other cities, relationships with other women, and so on. Her younger sister, who lives with Type 1 
Diabetes, spent much of her childhood in residence at the St. Joseph’s Home (SJH) for Chronically Ill 
Children here in Cape Town. After spending several years travelling back-and-forth between her mother 
and grandmother’s homes, she finally settled with her grandmother shortly before her eighth birthday. 
 Thandiwe said that the disruptions of her childhood led her to believe that, when she and her 
fiancé Paul found out she was pregnant, she would finally be able to build the kind of nuclear family 
she never had. However, upon finding out that Paul was having affair with a colleague at work mid-
way through her second trimester, she moved out of their shared home, broke off their engagement, and 
abandoned their plans to buy a home and raise their son together. “I felt so humiliated,” she said, “and 
all my plans blew up in my face; suddenly I was going to be an unmarried single mother.” She had 
intended on spending much of the first two years of her son Lungelo’s life either working part-time 
(doing consulting work) or as a full-time stay-at-home mother, but without Paul’s income, this became 
an impossibility. She drifted around for a while, first living with a friend in Claremont, then moving to 
Gardens, and then settling into an apartment in the affluent coastal suburb of Sea Point, an apartment 
she purchased in 2018, four months after her son was born.  
 By the time I first interviewed her, she no longer lusted after the nuclear family as the site at 
which home and intimacy might be founded since she had displaced it with another normative object: 
the apartment. I realised this one afternoon when she showed me the tasteful two lamps she had just 
bought, their tubes consisting of reedy anthropomorphic figures modelled on Giacometti sculptures. “I 
love lamps much more than overhead lights,” she said, “the light they give off is so warm and cosy, and 
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you don’t feel so exposed because they're not that bright.” The lamps were the latest objets to make 
their appearance in the renovation she had been undertaking at the apartment, which was lavished with 
care and attention and would serve, she hoped, as the site at which her new family unit might flourish. 
 With the dissolution of her and Paul’s relationship, the apartment, therefore, became the space 
in which her hopes for the ideal family could be actualised. “I really want to turn this into a home for 
us,” she said, “it feels strange to say this, but being here, alone with my son, actually feels inevitable, 
but in a really nice way. I’m very happy.” The warmth and joy Thandiwe evinced are illustrative, I 
argue, of how the reappropriation of normative objects (private property here) performs reparative 
work, enabling her to build a more generous future in the aftermath of a violent past.31 The apartment 
thus not only indicates the extent to which objects manifest relationships (Mauss, 2002 [1925]), have 
social lives (Appadurai, 1986), or express the negotiation of emotions (Drazin, 2014), but also how 
their value, and people’s affective investment in them, is premised on their absence in the past and their 
capacity to initiate alternative futures.  
 
Tracings the Workings of Power and Inequality 
Recognising the fact that normative relations and objects such as heterosexual marriage and private 
property ownership does reparative work is crucial, I argue, because it suggests why, under conditions 
of material scarcity and the violence of history, people might invest in them rather than repudiate them 
as injurious social forms.32 It demonstrates, therefore, that socio-political norms and given modes of 
 
31 The notion of reparative work mentioned here resonates with, but also diverges from, Melanie Klein's concept 
of reparation and Eve Sedgwick's method of reparative reading. Klein's (1937) psychoanalytic notion of 
reparation is a psychological process the subject undertakes in order to make mental repairs to a damaged 
internal world, in particular by repairing and restoring their psychic objects. Sedgwick’s (2003) literary notion of 
reparative reading is a method of reading texts in a way that emphasises their empowering and productive 
features, rather than simply or only critiquing their problematic aspects. In contrast to these two approaches, 
the notion of reparative work I discuss here is a socio-material process, one that refers to the everyday labour 
people undertake, in conversation with their pasts, in order to produce more bountiful futures. 
32 The same could possibly be said of some queer communities. In recent times, some Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender, and Intersex (LGBTI) groups have come under fire from radical queer theorists who point out that 
equality of gender and sexuality should not mean getting access to institutions (such as marriage, for example) 
that have historically excluded queer people. Termed “homonationalism” (Puar, 2007) and “queer liberalism” 
(Eng, 2010) such movements are critiqued for forgetting the queer capacity to serve as “resistance to regimes 
of the normal” (Warner, 1993) and instead reproduce a “same-sex version of the heteronormative nuclear 




sociality might not be a priori oppressive and repressive but, in fact, serve as the grounds on which 
people can activate their agentive capacities. Norms thus reproduce themselves by sticking on to 
people’s hopes and dreams and, in fact, serving as the foundation upon which those hopes and dreams 
might into fruition. At the same time, the workings of normativity tend to remain hidden in this process, 
precisely because of its attachment to people’s desires for caring and stable notions of home, which are 
often cast as ‘natural’ and inevitable. 
 This is clear in Rachel’s desires for the ideal nuclear family, which partly emerges out of her 
own sense of poverty and precarity. “Obviously, I’m not working,” she said, “but that doesn’t mean I 
want to eat his money [i.e. financially exploit him]. Though it’s nice to have a man that can take care 
of us.” One another score, it also emerges out of the failure of the relationships she had with her previous 
partners, her sons’ fathers. While her eldest son Luciano’s father, a member of the Numbers Gang,33 
was gunned down a month after their son celebrated his first birthday, her other children’s father, Derek, 
was, as she put, “‘n stuk gemos” (a piece of trash). “Do you know I bumped into him at Grand West 
[Casino] a few weeks ago?” she said, “he acted like he didn't see me. I approached him and said, ‘hey 
stranger’ and he greeted me in such a fake way. He ended up giving me R50. R50! After never having 
paid child support. Now you tell me, what am I supposed to do with R50?” 
 Rachel’s affective investment in her relationship with Pieter, therefore, affords her the 
opportunity to undo, however tenuously or provisionally, her precarious financial status and provide 
her sons with a father figure and stable home. In pointing out the instrumental, though seemingly 
affirmative, tenor of this project, my aim is not to criticise her. Rather, what I want to highlight are the 
ways in which an unequal political-economy makes the dependence on a patriarchal breadwinner her 
only way out of poverty. What is more, living in a time of (neo)liberalism means that such forms of 
 
“unquestionably resides in visible, intentional, and effective subversions of mainstream cultural norms and the 
related expectation that explicit and palpable transgression is the only sort of queerness worthy of the name”. 
Lewin’s own ethnographic work indicates that, for some queer people, “being a parent, being recognised as a 
married couple, or experiencing spiritual transcendence” was more important than transgressing social norms 
(2009: 603). She thus calls for “us to base our conclusions on what our informants say and do, rather than using 
what our informants say and do to sustain already formulated ideas,” (Lewin, 2009:604) even if, I would add, 
this disrupts some of our most cherished political values and ideals.  
33 The Numbers Gang is a prison gang that primarily operates in the Western Cape, but also has a network of 
members across South Africa working both inside and outside of the penal system. The Gang is at the centre of 
most forms of gang violence within the Cape Flats; Rachel's boyfriend lost his life in this kind of violence. 
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social suffering are not necessarily negated through the cultivation of a more just and generous public 
sphere and public culture, but rather through individual (and individualised) efforts aimed at inventively 
bringing more abundant futures into being. Although it might follow the form of what Berlant (2011) 
has called “cruel optimism”, her hope to marry Pieter is one of the few avenues to a better tomorrow 
Rachel has available.  
 In the same way that Rachel’s hopes illuminate the everyday fact of poverty and the work of 
survival, Thandiwe’s, too, alludes to the structure of socio-economic life. Racial logic and modern 
property law emerged side-by-side in various settler colonies from the eighteenth century onwards 
(Bhandar, 2018). South African political history, from the Natives Land Act of 1913 to the Group Areas 
Act of 1950, is replete with evidence of the ways in which private property ownership can serve as the 
grounds upon which institutionalised racism and legally-sanctioned modes of exclusion can operate. 
Thandiwe’s story, however, suggests a shift (though tentative) in the political-economy. This is because 
as recently as thirty years ago she – as a Black woman in South Africa – would not have been able to 
afford an apartment in Sea Point, and if she could have, might not have been allowed, by law, to live in 
that neighbourhood. Her narrative thus inverts Apartheid logic: whereas in the past private property 
served to exclude someone like her, now it is the basis on which she can build a flourishing life.34 
 Of course, the kinds of normative objects people attach themselves to and pin their hopes on 
are also indicative of their own position vis-à-vis the political economy. Unemployed and without a 
high-school certificate, Rachel does not have access to the same opportunities and material resources 
as Thandiwe, who is safely ensconced in the bosom of corporate South Africa and has the luxury to 
secure her son’s future on her own terms and with her own money. hopeful horizons the mothers in my 
study follow are thus intimately connected to their own access to particular kinds of capital. As much 
as their hopes reveal histories of trauma and the persistence of anachronistic social norms, such hopes 
are also indicative of contemporary forms of inequality. 
 However, despite the differences in their experiences, class positions, and the orientation of 
their desires, both my interlocutors’ hopes for the future nonetheless tell us that under certain conditions 
 
34 Thandiwe is, of course, an aberration to the norm. Most Black South Africans, most of the time, still reside in 
the under-resourced townships that the parliamentary acts noted here seeked to produce. 
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normative or hegemonic objects can serve as the sites at which a futural ‘otherwise’ might be brought 
into view. Michael Hardt (2011) reads Marx and finds a thinker that opposes love and money, and then 
love and property, in a schematic that asks us to invest in love (rather than property) as a means of 
building more caring forms of community and relationality. Although I am sympathetic to this argument 
– insofar as the unequal distribution of resources is what underpins most forms of social suffering – this 
opposition between love and property seems, to me, tenuous. Rachel and Thandiwe’s stories here 
indicate that love and self-interest, or, more broadly, the emotional form and the property form, cannot 
always be opposed to one another, given that it is precisely their conjoining which allows these two 
women to build more abundant futures for their children.  
 
Conclusion 
In the final analysis, my interlocutors’ hopes are indexical of traumatic histories and prevailing forms 
of deprivation, and their social worlds’ capacity to produce social relations marked by violence, 
abandonment, and volatility, relations my interlocutors seek to escape in the name of their children. At 
the same time, however, their hopes are also invested in normative objects of desire, given how these 
might perform reparative work, even as their very status as hegemonic entities means that they are 
capable of exclusion and domination. The social norms highlighted here thus not only oppress or delimit 
which forms of life thrive and which merely survive, but also provide the impetus through which new 
forms of self-making and the formation of new social worlds might occur. In the following chapter, I 
show how mothers’ hopeful projects are not only oriented toward particular persons and things but also 
toward themselves, often in ways that align with forms of neoliberal self-discipline and the notion of 









The Politics of Sacrificial Love 
 
Introduction 
 “Neoliberalism” has been a key concept in anthropological scholarship over the past two decades. In 
an extensive review article on its uses within the discipline Ganti (2014: 89) states that the term refers 
to both “a structural force that affects people’s life-chances” and “an ideology of governance that shapes 
subjectivities”. What this means is that neoliberal ideas can be found in places as diverse as formal 
market-places and occult economies (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000); public policy and bureaucratic 
practice (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002); the making of citizenship (Ong, 2006); and the making of the self 
(Freeman, 2014). But given its broad purview, what is the value of examining its logics while at the 
same time staying attentive to the particularities of our ethnographic fieldsites? How does attentiveness 
to the ways in which neoliberal ideas take hold within specific social contexts not only reveal its own 
contours but also those of the context in question? 
 In this chapter, I argue that the neoliberal notion of “responsibility”, and its attendant demand 
for self-discipline, is shaped by specific local histories and social practices. Drawing on the hopes of 
my interlocutors Rachel and Nema, I show how their efforts to remake themselves as accountable and, 
thus, “good” mothers are influenced by both the culturally specific meanings of motherhood in South 
Africa and adumbrated in culturally specific manners. Both Rachel and Nema forewent serving as the 
primary caregivers of their children in order that they may, respectively, have the time and space to 
become sober and financially secure. Their hopes to secure their children’s futures thus animated 
particular kinds of self-fashioning, while also generating what I call their “sacrificial love” – a decision 
to forego the intimacy of caring for their children on a daily basis in order that they might have the time 
and space to become better mothers.  
 These attempts at self-fashioning and the performance of “sacrificial love” are not 
individualised, atomistic, projects, however. Rather, they are inclusive of a range of different actors and 
tied to local understandings of motherhood and respectability as these have emerged through historical 
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processes of labour, dislocation, and material deprivation here in South Africa. Nonetheless, the 
everyday use of the notion of “responsibility” often positions it as an attribute of individual persons, 
similar to its usage by neoliberal market and state entities. This means that people’s failure to inhabit it 
both makes them vulnerable to social blame and is felt as emotionally taxing – a form of affect that is 
both experienced by my interlocutors and projected by them onto others. I finally suggest, however, 
that people might invest neoliberal notions of “responsibility” precisely because it does not always or 
necessarily function as an imposition, but rather a mode through which they might build more 
flourishing futures. 
 This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I provide a brief overview of 
some writing on the neoliberal notion of “responsibility”, bringing this literature into conversation with 
the experiences of my interlocutor Nema. I show how her attempt at being a responsible mother both 
relies on neoliberal notions of self-fashioning and accountability while also reiterating the long-standing 
South African form of mothering-at-a-distance. In the second section, I examine my interlocutor 
Rachel’s hopes to become sober, connecting these to local notions of decency and respectability and 
illustrating how the failure to be responsible is imagined as a failure to be a worthy person. In the final 
section, I show that despite the affective weight of living up to the notion of responsibility, people 
nevertheless invest in it given that, under precarious socio-economic conditions, it seems to offer a clear 
route toward building a more capacious and desirable future.  
 
Room to Move: Flexible Motherhood 
Recently, social theorists have located the discourse of “responsibility” as core to contemporary modes 
of (neo)liberal governmentality, a form of discipline that beckons actors to “shift their explanations for 
problems or concerns from external agents or forces to the self” (Pyysiäinen, Halpin, and Guilfoyle, 
2017: 216). By attributing freedom and autonomy to individual actors, it makes them solely accountable 
for their well-being through a grammar of “personal responsibility” and “self-care” (Lemke, 2001: 203). 
Should they fail in these objectives, they are rendered vulnerable to blame, social abandonment, and 
chronic harm. “Responsibility” is thus a rationality that “responds to the sufferer as if they were the 
sole author of their own misfortune” (Rose, 1996: 59). Such a narrow focus on individual decision-
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making occludes the often unequal political-economic contexts in which people are situated and thus 
elides the scarcity of resources and opportunities such contexts make available.  
 Though crafted within the realm of the political, “responsibility” also puts pressure on the 
supposedly intimate practices of motherhood and care. In her ethnography of the makings of 
motherhood in Ocean View, Cape Town, O’Rourke (2016) points out that the discourse of 
responsibility renders mothers ultimately accountable for their children’s health, while also positioning 
motherhood as an individual matter outside of global and local forms of socio-economy inequality. She 
illustrates how, for example, HIV-positive mothers at a local Moms & Tots group are rendered as 
“risky” subjects whose “good” and “bad” decisions are imagined to be the sole arbiter of their child’s 
welfare. Such a narrow analysis, O’Rourke (2016) argues, forgets the multiple relationships through 
which care takes place, minimises the impact of structural violence, and produces a situation that makes 
the mother, alone, vulnerable to blame should anything adverse happen to her child. 
 This notion of responsibility was certainly present in my own ethnographic work, uttered even 
by mothers themselves. During her lunch break at work in June 2018, Nema and I sat down on a bench 
in a courtyard near her office, smoking cigarettes and eating gummy bears. She began showing me the 
vision board she had made, a collage that was meant to depict the kind of future she desired for her 
daughter. Several words and images on the canvas stood out to me: the symbols of the US Dollar, Euro, 
and Pound Sterling; a sturdy brick wall; and the words “responsibility” and “sustainability”. Nema 
noted that the last two words referred to the fact that the kind of future she hoped for her daughter will 
“require a lot of thinking on [her] part in terms of how to sustain it.” Among these included her decision 
to take her current post as an administrative assistant because her previous one, as a workshop facilitator 
at a human rights non-profit organisation, did not offer enough money, benefits, or security.  
 To provide her daughter with a more generous future she needed money. She made the point 
that she attended “a terrible government school” and would thus like to give her daughter a private 
education. “My hope is to get her into a good school so that she can have all the opportunities I didn’t 
have.” To secure this, Nema is completing a Master’s degree part-time while working full-time, two 
activities that, together, had become a fatiguing project. However, Nema was not a solitary and heroic 
figure working at unsustainable levels to secure her daughter future, but also relied on a network of 
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people who are helping her raise her daughter. Though she lives in Philipi, Cape Town, her daughter 
lives outside Butterworth in the Eastern Cape with her parents and is taken care of on a daily basis by 
one of her cousins, to whom Nema pays a monthly stipend. Crafting herself as a “responsible” mother 
has thus meant forgoing the intimacy of everyday care in order to secure her and her daughter’s financial 
future.  
 Her choices are not unique, however. Scholars working on the history of motherhood in 
southern Africa have continually illustrated that mothers across the racial and class spectrum have not 
always been the primary caregivers of their children. As Cherryl Walker points out in a notable 
discussion on the topic of motherhood in South Africa specifically, physical care of children are often 
delegated to others – in the case of white and/or middle-class women, to a domestic worker or nanny, 
and in the case of black and/or working-class women, to other relatives, “such as grandmothers or older 
siblings” (Walker, 1995: 425). Becoming a “responsible” mother might, therefore, in practice, mean 
mothering from a distance.35 Furthermore, this kind of sacrificial love has taken on a near normative 
status in South Africa, where histories of internal circular migration have, for many Black people, meant 
the impossibility of the nuclear family and the stretching of relatives across space.36  
 Discourses of “responsibility” are thus embedded in local understandings of motherhood as 
these have emerged from historical processes of dislocation and the shape of the political-economy. 
They are not simply imparted by institutions of the state, such as the Moms and Tots group, in 
O’Rourke’s (2015) example, but also form part of the few routes available to women in contexts that 
are inimical to their and their children’s flourishing. Given how expensive quality childcare in Cape 
Town is and given her fear that her daughter might be endangered or neglected if she is not cared for 
by relatives,37 Nema’s sacrificial love is thus an investment in “responsibility” and a way of being an 
 
35 This is not unique to South Africa. See Salazar Parreñas (2001) and Tyldum (2015) for examples of these 
dynamics among Filipino and Ukrainian female migrant workers, respectively. 
36 The dispersal of family members was often facilitated by the pass laws, an internal passport system that was 
designed to segregate the country's Black population. These laws policed which areas of the country people 
could enter into and people were often heavily penalised for not carrying their pass books when outside the 
area designated to their racial grouping. 
37 It is uncommon to see older women in townships across Cape Town – including Philipi, where Nema lives – 
run day-care centres out of their homes. When I had asked Nema why she could not send her daughter to one 
of these centres during the day (while she was at work), she mentioned her worry about her daughter’s safety 
as a key reason. 
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accountable mother. What is more, it also allows her to have the time and space to realise her hope of 
becoming financially stable and, through this, secure her daughter’s future. Although the making of the 
“responsible” subject is imagined to be an autonomous, activity, it is fundamentally social and 
dependent on others. 
 
Hope, Sobriety, and the Politics of Respectability  
Although mothers may invest in “responsibility” as a means to secure their children’s future, this mode 
of accountability also operates as a form of discipline. Like Nema, my interlocutor Rachel also forewent 
serving as the primary caregiver of her child. In June 2018, she asked if her eldest son Luciano (then 
aged 7) could move into the home of her brother Ricardo and sister-in-law Nicole. Their own children 
were grown up and Rachel felt the couple could better take care of the boy, given how overstretched 
she was both in terms of money and the time and energy she can provide her three children. Although 
she was relieved and thankful for their generosity, she told me several times that once she’s “sorted 
[her] life out” her son will come and live with her again. Her hope to remake herself as a “responsible 
subject” and thus a “good mother” therefore operated, like Nema before her, as a form of sacrificial 
love with a particular kind of temporality: once she is fully responsibilised the boy can come live with 
her again. 
 Unlike Nema, who was attempting to secure her and her daughter’s financial future, Rachel’s 
hope was to become sober. During one of our very first interviews, in 2017, I had asked Rachel what 
she gets up to for fun, to which she responded: “I watch TV and I drink”. Although I initially took this 
as a joke, a year later, while conducting a life-history interview in March 2018, she told me about her 
long struggle with substance abuse. She started drinking and smoking at a fairly young age (14 or 15) 
and was later suspended from high-school for smoking marijuana. Harder drugs, like methamphetamine 
(colloquially known as tik), followed suit, although her parents later performed an intervention and 
checked her into a rehabilitation centre in Eerste River. When she exited the centre she no longer took 
any hard drugs, but then began drinking heavily. Although her drinking is much less than it was during 
the 2009/2010 period, she still struggled with alcohol consumption. And this is why she reiterated her 
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desire to quit drinking across several interviews and often equated becoming sober with becoming a 
“responsible” and, therefore, a “good mother”. 
 “I drink a lot,” she told me in March 2018, “a lot. But I know I’m going to stop eventually. I 
just need to get my life together.” Although she remained vague about what plans she was taking to 
actualise her hope of becoming sober, she nevertheless reiterated her desire to quit drinking across 
several different interviews. Her hope for her children’s future was thus, like Nema’s before her, both 
about the and about herself – about the kind of person she wants to be, the kind of mother she wants to 
be, the kind of care she wants to offer. Of course, this will not be an easy task. Rachel’s long history of 
substance abuse is compounded by the fact that in many households in the street where she and I live 
up to two-thirds of adults might be unemployed. And alcoholism and other forms of substance abuse is 
a big part of life here, as it is in other places where endemic poverty is a fact of everyday life (Goldstein, 
2003; Ross, 2010; Knight, 2015). 
 At the same time, however, Rachel’s hope for sobriety was not an entirely autonomous 
decision. This was clear to me given that, in the two years I worked with her, her children always 
seemed happy and healthy – the demand for sobriety and responsibility was thus not hers alone, since 
she appeared, in practice, to be a good mother. One person who did make this demand, however, was 
her late boyfriend’s mother Linda, her son Luciano’s grandmother, who had asked for the boy to come 
and live with her the previous year. Out of dislike for the old woman, however, Rachel refused this 
offer. In retaliation, Linda threatened to report Rachel to the Department of Social Development (DSD) 
and, through this, cut off her child support grants from the South African Social Services Agency 
(SASSA).38 Linda’s grounds for complaint were that Rachel was an “alcoholic” and an “unfit mother”, 
two epithets she bandied about through casual gossip and which she situated as being on a continuum 
of Rachel’s long tendency to be a “kans-vatter” (chancer) who was not “ordentlik” (respectable).  
 In making these accusations, Linda was drawing on long-standing notions of decency that often 
operate as forms of gendered and racialised social policing (Ross, 2010; Salo, 2004, 2009). Discourses 
of ordentlikheid/respectability become the means through which, in some contexts in Cape Town, 
 
38 SASSA is a governmental body which distributes social security grants to citizens who need it. In 2018, the 
monthly childcare grant Rachel would have received was R400 (approximately US$26) per child.  
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“young women’s morality is judged by [an] older generation of women,” (Salo, 2009: 15). Such 
judgements are not, however, deracinated calls for piety and decorum, but rather emerge out of 
patriarchal views of female modesty and Black people’s attempts to craft themselves as worthy subjects 
in the face of social systems which do not recognise them as such.39 In this way, Rachel’s alcohol 
dependency not only calls into question her capacity to remain accountable in her duties as a mother 
but also, in the local context, renders tenuous her claim of being a reputable woman worthy of respect.  
 It is for this reason that she continually reiterated her desire to become sober, responsible, and 
have her son come live with her again, something attested to by numerous quotes from various 
interviews: “parents should take care of their children”, “of course I want what’s best for my children,” 
“now that my mother is gone I need to raise my children myself”, “I need to raise my own children and 
not give them away to other people”, “I would like to take care of my own children”.  The discourse of 
responsibility is thus not only an impositional demand that subordinates her and that she wishes to 
oppose, but is, in fact, part of her interiority and her subjective understanding of what it means to be a 
“good mother” and what she needs to do to get there. What this means, thus, is that although 
responsibility as a discourse is imparted from above (the state, the media, and so on) and crafted 
relationally (with institutional or intimate others), how it is experienced and felt is as an ontological 
component of the human, rather than a culturally constituted way of being and doing. 
 
Bad Affects: Shame, Fear, Anxiety, Anger 
Because the capacity to be accountable appears as an individual attribute, the project of responsibilising 
oneself has heavy affective and emotional costs. When Rachel told me about Linda’s threats she almost 
burst into tears. At a meeting in May 2018, she noted that Luciano had spent the previous afternoon at 
his grandmother’s home. When Rachel went to pick him up early in the evening, her quarrel with the 
boy’s grandmother was reignited and she was threatened again with being reported to social services 
on the grounds that she was an “unfit mother”. “What does an ‘unfit mother’ look like?” she asked me 
angrily, “do I look like an ‘unfit mother’?” What I thought was a rhetorical question was instead aimed 
 
39 In this way, the notion of ordentlikheid mentioned here is almost analogous to what has been termed 
“respectability politics” in the United States; see Harris (2014). 
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at me. “I’m asking you,” she said, “do I look like an unfit mother?” I responded hastily – “no, no, no, 
of course not” – but could not shake the feeling that my response would not assuage her anxieties in 
any way. Her hope to become sober and responsible, and the optimism of that hope, was thus also tied 
up with feelings of shame and doubt.  
 In a similar but different way, Nema was also distressed by the fact that, although she had 
changed jobs and put herself on a strict budget to become more financially responsible, she was still 
struggling financially. “Every month on payday my debit orders go off and I have these mini-panic 
attacks.” Furthermore, she continually chastised herself for not putting money away into her savings 
account, even though this was not always a feasible thing to do. Finally, what gave Nema further anxiety 
was her daughter (who was one year and a few months old during our research period) did not always 
recognise her as her mother. On her return from a visit to the Eastern Cape in October, she told me how 
her daughter was friendly and bubbly, but that she was almost sure the girl thought of her grandmother 
– Nema’s mother – as her mother, rather than Nema herself. Her anxiety about this was further 
compounded by the fact that her new partner was a single father to a five-year-old daughter. “It gets at 
me because obviously, I see him all the time with his daughter; he’s there with her, every day, and he’s 
doing it alone. Meanwhile, I don’t have money to go to the Eastern Cape all the time”. 
 Of course, as much as people who hope to responsibilise themselves feel the emotional burden 
of such a project, they also project it onto to others, something that was clear in Nema’s discussions of 
her daughter’s father, Asanda. Their deteriorating relationship during our period of research both attests 
to the perception that responsibility is a core component of persons and their character and highlights 
how dishonour is imparted onto those who fail to successfully inhabit it. When Nema and I met up for 
an after-work drink in October 2018 and had a brief check-in, she had just come off a phone call with 
him. She was taking the trip to the Eastern Cape noted in the previous paragraph and, although she and 
Asanda had broken up in April of that year, one of her duffle bags was still at his home in Nyanga and 
she intended on picking it up after our meeting. “If I didn’t need the bag I wouldn’t have called him at 




This irresponsibility is primarily manifested in his checkered history with paying child support. As she 
noted, although he paid child support during most of their relationship, even then he was irresponsible 
with money. “Once [in 2017], when he got paid, he took all his friends out for drinks, buying bottles, 
buying shots, with no recognition of whatsoever of the fact that he has a child at home.” In December 
2017, he bought their daughter clothes in lieu of the R800-R1,00040 he usually gave in child support. 
He gave this amount again in January and February 2018, but then this tapered out. “He got into trouble 
at work,” she said, “I don’t really know what he did because he was so shady about the whole thing.” 
As part of this “work trouble” Asanda had to appear in front of a disciplinary committee, an event Nema 
had no strong feelings about, except for the effect it would have on his child support payments, which 
virtually stopped after the February payment. 
 When April arrived and he had not let Nema know about his employment status, she broke up 
with him and cut off all outbound communication. When he would message her she would give him the 
courtesy of responding, but made it clear that she wanted nothing more to do with him, although this 
did not, of course, mean that he could not be involved in their daughter’s life. “I’m over it,” she told me 
in October, “if you’re not in a good financial space as a parent and need to sort yourself out, then say 
so, but I’m not gonna chase you.” She found his financial irresponsibility and lack of communication 
jarring, particularly in light of his earlier insistence that their daughter live with them in Cape Town, 
rather than with her parents in the Eastern Cape. “Imagine!” she exclaimed, “I would be stuck with this 
kid now, working, studying, paying rent, and paying for someone to take care of her during the day and 
he would be doing this shit!” But it’s typical of him.”  
 Under precarious socio-economic conditions, Nema’s anger at Asanda’s failure at being a 
responsible subject and father is understandable: she and her daughter’s livelihoods are at stake. What 
this means, however, is that responsibility in this schematic is thus not only or necessarily an imposition 
that seeks to dominate, but something that lays the groundwork for the securing of their daughter’s 
future, which is why Nema invests her hopes into it. What is more, the fact that the call to responsibility 
emerges out of (neo)liberal modes of governmentality and draws on local histories and cultural forms 
 
40 Approximately US$53-US$66. 
 
62 
is obscured, since the capacity for accountability is viewed not as an externally derived interpellation 
but rather a core component of one’s character – hence Nema’s assertion that Asanda’s irresponsibility 
is “typical” of his personality or disposition.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined my interlocutors Nema and Rachel’s hopes to remake themselves as 
“responsible” subjects and, through this, secure their children’s futures. In order to actualise their 
desires for financial security and sobriety, however, they have had to forgo serving as their children’s 
primary caregivers. Their attempts at responsibilisation, and its concomitant form of sacrificial love, 
draws on notions of motherhood and respectability as these have historically emerged in South Africa. 
Furthermore, living up to the ideal of responsibility can be an affective burden, an experience my 
interlocutors both inhabit and project onto others. In the final analysis, however, they invest in this 
notion because it offers them a clear route through which to secure their children’s futures. In the 
following chapter, I show how mothers not only invest their hopes in remaking themselves, but also 
their children, in order to prepare them for entry into lifeworlds marked by entrenched hierarchies and 














Mothering and/as Transformative Pedagogy 
 
Introduction 
Anthropologists and other scholars have acknowledged that mothering is “crucial to the transmission 
of culture, the development of enculturated persons, the constitution of kinship, family, and household, 
and the reproduction of society,” (Barlow and Chapin, 2010: 324). As such, mothering operates 
alongside other routine and everyday practices which serve as sites for the development of the subject’s 
habitus (Bourdieu, 1977), while also acting as a space at which the self and culture become embodied 
(Csordas, 1994). This process of acculturation produces the subject for and in society, while it itself is 
also imbued with, or conditioned by, the structures of that society. This does not, however, mean that 
childrearing practices always or only produce prevailing power relations; feminist mothering, for 
example, draws upon feminist philosophies to engage in the work of childcare in a way that challenges 
patriarchal power and privilege (O’Reilly, 2008).  
 It is this kind of oppositional stance I wish to highlight in this chapter, since my interlocutors 
Hlumile and Robyn’s hopes for their children’s futures are centred on their not experiencing or 
reproducing prevailing forms of gender-based violence and racialised inequality. Their efforts in this 
vein thus resonate with those taken up during Apartheid, a time in which some Black women activists 
mobilised via their identities as mothers, taking up advocacy work that opposed the state in the name 
of securing their children’s futures (Stevenson, 2011). Where Hlumile and Robyn differ from these 
maternal predecessors, however, is that their attempts at producing a futural otherwise for their children 
do not take place within the realm of formal politics, such as a social movement or civil society 
organisation. Rather, it occurs within the intimacy of the home, as a progressive, transformative, 
pedagogy that is part-and-parcel of their everyday mothering practice.  
 As I will show in this chapter, their hopeful efforts and educative attempts often arise out of 
their own experiences of racialised or gender-based violence. Furthermore, these efforts have the benefit 
of providing their children with safe and age-appropriate spaces within which to discuss issues of race 
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or gender, for example, that are often either adulterated, misconstrued or swept under the rug in other 
areas of South African social life.41 At the same time, however, I show how such hopeful practices can 
be undercut by being delivered outside a social justice framework, the emergence of more concrete 
needs of the child, and the fact that mothers are not always the sole caregivers of their offspring. I finally 
suggest that their hopeful horizons and transformative pedagogies are indexical of liberal lifeworlds in 
which individuals are tasked to solve socio-political problems through individual initiative.  
 This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I delineate Hlumile’s hope to 
prevent her daughters from experiencing gender-based violence through an everyday pedagogy that 
emphasises bodily autonomy, female strength, and self-love, emphasising both the values and limits of 
this effort. In the second section, I turn to Robyn’s efforts to teach her sons about their privilege as 
white-passing middle-class men, and illustrate how this project was challenged by her elder son’s move 
to Northern Ireland to live with his father and paternal family. In the final section, I reflect on how their 
hopes reveal a broader fact of South African public life – the tendency to celebrate the efforts of 
individual actors and in so doing both occlude the workings of power and the possibility of collective 
attempts at problem-solving.  
 
Nurturing Honesty, Transparency, and Self-Love 
Hlumile hoped her daughters would not experience the same kind of violent intimate relationships she 
experienced as a young woman, and so in this way she taught her six-year old daughter42 about periods, 
tampons, consent, sex, and other forms of intimacy, teachings in contrast to her own upbringing. She 
spent much of her young life living with her grandparents in the Eastern Cape, her parents having moved 
to Cape Town as migrant labourers before her tenth birthday. “It would have been useful to live with 
my parents,” she said, “if only because they could’ve warned me about things: boys, drugs, stuff like 
that, which my grandparents didn’t. I think my teens and twenties would have turned out much more 
 
41 I should highlight here that both Hlumile and Robyn have postgraduate degrees and move in mostly educated, 
middle-class, circles. They thus have access to a particular kind of vocabulary or conceptual language with which 
to do the transformative pedagogy noted below, something that many families in South Africa would not 
necessarily have access to.  
42 She also has a younger daughter, who was just over one year old during the time we did our research. 
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differently.” She noted how her grandparents simply wanted her to “wake up, go to school, clean my 
room, etc.”. A discussion about her period never occurred, neither did one about sex. “I definitely would 
have been shaped different if I grew up with my parents. I loved my grandparents but they were almost 
like background figures to my adolescence.” Hlumile does not impart blame on anyone: her parents 
worked in Cape Town, ultimately, to be able to support her and her siblings. Her grandparents thus did 
their best, but “they were also old and tired and couldn’t play all the roles a young child needed.” 
 What we see here is another iteration of the effects of migrant labour under Apartheid: how a 
racialised political-economy thrust her parents into moving to and working in other cities to support 
their children. This form of “sacrificial love” is not, of course, a unique story43, especially for women 
like Hlumile’s mother, a domestic worker, who often had to leave their own children to be taken care 
of by relatives while they lived elsewhere caring for the children of the white middle-classes. Her 
childhood living arrangements can, therefore, be read as an instantiation of Ubuntu and the inventive 
survival tactics Black families deployed to survive under conditions of structural. At the same time, I 
would be hesitant to make such a triumphalist argument, given the pain it has caused Hlumile. What 
we can take away from this, however, is the way in which her parents and grandparents become, in her 
narrative, “the instantiation of the temporal”, where they “signify the Apartheid past” and “an 
anachronistic subject-position that is deployed to demonstrate intergenerational change” (Mohamed and 
Ratele, 2012: 283). 
 It is this desire for intergenerational change that made her promise herself to be “more present” 
for her children and impart to them the kinds of teachings she did not receive. Whereas in the past a 
myriad of topics might be off-limits with her grandparents, now she cultivates a sense of open 
communication and trust with her daughter. “It was a different generation then, so there were lots you 
couldn’t talk about,” she said. “There’s an openness now, however.”44 One of the key reasons Hlumile 
has taken it upon herself to engage in what is usually viewed as “sensitive” conversations with her 
 
43 See Nema’s story in Chapter 3, as well as Salazar Parreñas (2001) and Tyldum (2015) for examples of these 
dynamics in other parts of the world. 
44 To add, in many African societies there are often prescriptions about how to address one's grandparents, 
given the strong cultural value of respecting elders (Sesanti, 2010). This might be another reason why Hlumile 




children is because of her own experience of sexual violence, itself situated at a period in her life when, 
she says, she was drinking heavily and going out a lot. Many of these experiences she connected to her 
parents’ absence from her childhood and the lack of emotional and intellectual support she received 
from her grandparents.  
 “When you’re in doubt, when you don’t love yourself, you start doing things you don’t want to 
do and you get to a space to please others thinking that this will somehow make them love and validate 
you,” she said. “You look for love, you look to fit in, but if you love yourself you will know when to 
draw the line.” In other words, the strategy of open communication and conversation of sensitive issues 
are connected to what she hoped will cultivate in her daughters a sense of self-love, self-confidence, 
and self-esteem. These traits, she believed, might preclude the possibility that they will fall prey to peer 
pressure, violence, and unhealthy relationships. In other words, her hopes that her daughters may 
become healthy, confident, and self-loving women animate a particular kind of mothering practice and 
everyday pedagogy, a practice and pedagogy that is set in contrast to the parenting she received and 
which she believed led to some of the experiences she had as a young woman. 
 The value of this effort is that she is creating a relationship of open and honest communication 
with her daughter, something that produces transparency, diminishes shame, and informs her daughter 
that she can always count on her mother for support. Hlumile’s educative attempts are also in many 
ways, as she herself points out, different from a previous generation, where discussion of women’s 
sexuality and bodily autonomy did not always necessarily occur. In South Africa, as in other parts of 
the world, sexual behaviour and expression is often rendered taboo and regulated into invisibility (Sait, 
Lorenzo, Steyn, and van Zyl, 2009), something that increases the risk of sexual abuse (Higson-Smith, 
2004). By having everyday conversations about consent, reproductive health, and female self-care, 
Hlumile is thus bringing into view forms of knowledge that are often not widely available and/or might 
only reach her daughter at a much later stage.  
 However, Hlumile’s efforts also have their limits. Her invocation of feminine strength, self-
confidence, and self-love in some ways shifts the question of gender-based violence away from a social 
justice frame-work and into an individualised, sentimentalised, tenor of personal strength and character. 
This kind of shift does not, in fact, allow for the disruption of the kinds of patriarchal social relations 
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that caused her sexual assault. In saying this, my point is not to criticise her but rather to point out that 
she is doing unpaid domestic and emotional labour that would not need to be done in a more caring, 
generous, and socially just society. Although her pedagogy forms part of the everyday work of 
parenting, it is also, however, indexical of the high-levels of gender-based violence in our context. Her 
hopeful practice is thus on intimate terms with despair and renders tenuous, in its form and content, the 
liberal distinction between public and private domains.  
 
Cultivating New Masculinities 
Like Hlumile, Robyn is also working on teaching her children to do and live otherwise. When I asked 
her what she would leave in a bottle for them to find in twenty years’ time, she stated that she hopes 
they will recognise their privilege and responsibility as white-passing men with EU passports and hopes 
that they would understand what it means for them to move through a world in which whiteness and 
masculinity are accorded so much power, status, and privilege. “I would tell them that they have a 
responsibility as white-passing, (if they are) cis-gender, (if they are), heterosexual men and that they 
have the responsibility not to continue that legacy.” She went on to say that she hopes to both “protect 
them from the white supremacist capitalist patriarchy” and teach them to try and undo it. “I would tell 
them that social justice is everyone’s work, including theirs”.  
 Her politics as a feminist is manifested in pedagogical practices that are rooted, like Hlumile’s, 
in open, honest, though casual and age-appropriate conversations about a range of different topics – 
including consent and bodily autonomy, as well as issues of gender, sexuality, and the economic 
privilege that they hold vis-à-vis other children here in South Africa. During an interview in October 
2018, she noted with pride how her son had internalised some of her teachings, questioning, for 
example, why the word “vagina” had been bleeped out of a song on the radio (“He said, ‘what’s wrong 
with a vagina, why are they treating it like a swearword?’”) and criticising his father for asserting that 
dresses are only for girls. “He told his father that there’s nothing wrong with boys wearing dresses and 




 Like Hlumile, her pedagogical efforts emerge out of an earlier, painful, experience, one that is 
rooted in prevailing social hierarchies. In July 2018, during a casual conversation at a workshop on race 
she and I attended, Robyn told me that shortly after her son was born a member of her then husband’s 
family – a white woman – exclaimed, “thank god he’s white!” This relative’s comment racially othered 
Robyn while celebrating her son’s phenotypical features and thus his presumed inclusion in whiteness. 
Although it was a painful experience, Robyn told me that it was also a formative and important one: 
because it marked a moment of coming to consciousness for her, when “[her] sense of comfort within 
whiteness and white spaces” was broken and she started reading black feminist theory and identifying 
herself as a feminist. Her mothering practice thus takes the form of a pedagogy that manifests her 
feminist beliefs, one that aims to teach her sons about the past and present role unequal race and gender 
relations have played in generating and advancing different forms of structural and affective violence. 
 But such attempts at ethical parenting can be disrupted, particularly when mothers may not 
always or only be the primary caregivers of their children. When Robyn and I met up in October she 
was anxious about the fact that she could no longer continue her pedagogical work. She had just returned 
from Northern Ireland, where she helped her seven year old son settle into living with his father and 
paternal family, a decision that was made to get him access to the best educational and medical 
resources. “Quality healthcare and education are free [in Northern Ireland]. Kirby has ADHD and was 
previously diagnosed on the Autism spectrum. Although most of that is behind us, having access to 
inclusive education is important, particularly in a way that doesn’t break the bank.” Access to affordable 
quality education and healthcare for children with developmental disorders is very expensive here in 
South Africa, even for someone like Robyn with middle-class privilege, hence their decision. 
 She was crushed by the fact that her son now lives a continent away (“I feel like I’ve lost a 
limb”), and although the move was in his best interests, she was still worried about his upbringing. She 
told me about how taken aback she was at her ex-husband’s family’s home: “he [her son] now lives in 
a house on a hill with a paddock, ponies, chickens, and no fences, just hills in every direction, and most 
of that land is theirs. Even in a Northern Ireland context they are wealthy, not just by South African 
standards. Three to four cars in the driveway, a five-bedroom house.” She also noted how, when walking 
around the town near where they live she “saw probably five people of colour for the whole two weeks 
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[she] was there”. She was thus worried about the effect such material abundance and racial and cultural 
homogeneity will have on her son and the pedagogical work she had done thus far. 
 Robyn's story reveals some of the pressures disability places on kin relations (Rapp and 
Ginsburg, 2001), while also illustrating how citizenship and the politics of place can either empower or 
fail those with an impairment (Das and Addlakha, 2001). Furthermore, like Hlumile before her, she is 
attempting to ameliorate socio-political problems through her everyday mothering practice, something 
that tells us a lot about how riven the local context is not only with gender-based violence but also forms 
of racialised inequality. Her story is also indicative, however, of how such hopeful projects can be side-
lined by the emergence of other, more urgent, and certainly more concrete needs as well as the fact that 
childcare, in Robyn’s case brutally so, does not take place within the mother-child dyad alone, but also 
includes the presence and practices of various actors. 
 
The Placement of the Ethical Injunction 
In delineating Hlumile and Robyn’s transformative pedagogies and indicating the ways in which these 
can be undercut by a range of other projects and initiatives, my aim is not to criticise my interlocutors 
for failing to achieve the goals of progressive politics and building more generous worlds – since these 
are also their goals and the impetus which gives rise to their pedagogical practices in the first place.  
 Rather, what I want to point to is how abhorrent our society is for asking mothers to do this in 
the first place, an experience that is not unique to my interlocutors. Ross (2014: 55) observes how a 
social programme in Manenberg, Cape Town, seeks to prevent children in the community from entering 
a life of gangsterism and drug addiction by educating mothers – thus rendering mothers, rather than a 
deprived and precarious context, the problem to be solved. Similarly, O’Rourke (2015) notes how 
another parenting group in Ocean View, Cape Town, proffers maternal responsibility for ensuring the 
future well-being of children while underplaying the life-chances a resource-poor context makes 
possible. This effectively occludes history and the political-economy in favour of an emphasis on 
individual will and determination. 
 The fact that these individual women are supposed to solve social problems – be they 
gangsterism and endemic drug use, as in Ross (2014) or the violence of racialised inequality, as with 
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Robyn here – is indicative of the failure of the post-Apartheid project and South African society's ability 
to collectively deal with the range of social ills its history and politics have generated. This failure is 
manifested, on the one hand, by broader political issues: including the complete deletion of 
redistributive justice post-1994; the emphasis of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) on 
reconciliation rather than justice and reparation; the spectacular forms of theft and pillaging we bore 
witness to during the Zuma administration; and the continuation of unequal gender relations and their 
most visceral manifestation in gender-based violence and femicide. 
 On the other hand, this failure is also continued in the narrative of public life, narratives that 
emphasise individual will and determination yet occlude the precarious political-economy that gives 
rise to the need for individual will and determination in the first place. I am reminded, while writing 
this, of a recent conversation with a friend on the praise received by Siya Kolisi, captain of the national 
rugby team. Much of this praise, circulating in both the traditional media and social media, focused on 
his impressive ability to have risen out of poverty and lead the team to victory in the 2019 Rugby World 
Cup. What was ignored, however, is the fact that he is one very few young Black South Africans to 
have escaped poverty, and that we should not just praise individual efforts, but also try to find collective 
ways of ensuring that all children have more abundant and capacious futures available to them. 
 The emphasis on individual effort and responsibility is, as I pointed out in Chapter 4, a 
consequence of (neo)liberal logic. This logic is premised on the retraction of the state and collective 
bodies and asks individuals to invent and operationalise individual solutions to what are ultimately 
social and political problems. In some instances, this is imparted from above, as with Ross (2014) and 
O’Rourke (2015), while in others it is also part of people’s own histories, politics, and desires, as I have 
pointed out throughout this dissertation. Both, however, are indicative of the displacing of a collective 
approach to problem-solving in favour of an individual one, something that places an undue affective 
burden on individual actors as they go about their life-building efforts.  
 Of course, the forms of care and pedagogy noted here cannot only be interpreted as (neo)liberal 
in form and substance. As Ross (2014) points out, the emphasis on maternal responsibility is also part-
and-parcel of notions of “family values” which long predate contemporary capitalism’s form. At the 
same time, however, I would argue that it is nevertheless indicative of a longstanding tenet of liberalism 
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more generally, a logical consequence of the promotion of the sovereign and autonomous individual, 
and the idea that persons are “free” to remake themselves and change the course of their lives. There is 
nothing inherently wrong with such a notion, except that it conceals the workings of power and forgets 
that individual freedom and self-making are not unregimented endeavours but rather deeply shaped, 
and often constrained, by the social conditions in which they take place.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined my interlocutors Hlumile and Robyn’s hopes to ensure more caring 
futures for their children via a transformative pedagogy that forms part-and-parcel of their everyday 
mothering practices. Rooted in their own prior experiences of gender-based and racialised violence, 
these educative attempts aim to prevent their children from either experiencing or reproducing such 
social relations. The value of their efforts lay in the fact that they enable the emergence of discussions 
around issues of race, class, and gender that are otherwise unheeded, thus contributing to a change in 
the structural, however piecemeal or provisional. At the same time, however such forms of pedagogy 
can be undercut by taking place outside a social justice framework, the emergence of more concrete 
needs of the child, and the fact that mothers are not always or only the primary caregivers, and thus 
teachers of moral wisdom, to their children. Ultimately, my interlocutors hopes’ are indexical of the 
forms of violence and inequality that are so prevalent in our context. Furthermore, the fact that they 
have to do this work is indicative of a public sphere that celebrates individual efforts at the expense of 












In this dissertation I have tracked the hopes and hopeful practices of six Black women living and raising 
children primarily in Cape Town, South Africa. I have shown how these hopes aim to bring into being 
futures marked by upward mobility, stable and loving kinship relations, financial security and sobriety, 
and more just and caring worlds. In Chapter 1, The Promise of Hope: A Literature Review, I outlined 
three approaches scholars have taken in examining the practice of hope, (a) hope as a product of social 
relations, (b) hope as a moral claim toward the future and a necessary additive to progressive politics, 
and (c) hope as a method of knowledge formation. I have stated that my own approach combines aspects 
of each of these in order to argue that hope is an index of prevailing forms of power and inequality, and 
thus a useful concept with which to gain critical knowledge about a given social world. 
 I delineated this argument across four ethnographic chapters. Chapter 2, An Archive of 
Longings, brought my interlocutors Hlumile and Angela’s hopes for upward mobility into conversation 
with Stef Jansen’s ethnography Yearnings in the Meantime (2017) in order to argue that the desire for 
“ordinary objects” and “normal lives” are indicative not only of the workings of an economy of scarcity 
but also the specifics of time and place. In Chapter 3, (Normative) Objects of Desire, I argued that my 
interlocutors Rachel and Thandiwe’s hopeful investments in the hegemonic entities of heterosexual 
marriage and private property perform what I call “reparative work”, allowing them to build kinship 
forms which they had before been excluded from. In Chapter 4, The Politics of Sacrificial Love, I argued 
that my interlocutors Nema and Rachel’s efforts at becoming financially secure and sober both align 
with neoliberal notions of responsibility and self-discipline, while also enabling them to secure their 
children’s futures. And finally, in Chapter 5, Mothering and/as Transformative Pedagogy, I argued that 
my interlocutors Hlumile and Robyn’s educative attempts to prepare their children to entry into worlds 
marked by violence and inequality is indicative of the (neo)liberal demand that individual subjects solve 
social problems through individual initiative. Across all these chapters, I have thus shown how their 
hopes tack back and forth between the pragmatic and the utopian. All, however, are repudiations of the 
current order of things or how things might have ended up, and thus hold a positive relation to the 
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future, the Blochian “not yet” and the Povinellian “otherwise” that is not underpinned by precarity and 
violent social relations.  
 Despite the scope of this dissertation, it also has limitations. The constraints of time has meant 
that I had very little opportunity to engage with the children’s fathers and other members of my 
interlocutors’ families means that I have not been able to access crucial information about the roles 
played by actors (other than mothers) who collectively work toward actualising particular kinds of 
hopes. Furthermore, my emphasis on mothers alone means I do not come to know whether there is a 
clear correspondence between their hopes and those held by their children’s fathers and, if not, what 
this divergence means for how the child is raised. Future study around the category of hope as it relates 
to childrearing would thus need to engage with several family members beyond mothers – including 
fathers, grandparents, siblings, and, possibly, the children themselves.  
 Nonetheless, given that my focus has been on the form and content of particular kinds of hopes 
– rather than whether or not they become actualised and through what means – the work I have done 
here is nevertheless hold value, given that it sheds light on the contours of the social, political, and 
economic worlds in which the next generation of human are reared. Furthermore, it provides an account 
of agency that is not premised on notions of liberal autonomy or radical resistance, but instead unfurls 
as a navigation and negotiation of ordinary practices (building a home, becoming sober, saving money) 
which often hold an ambivalent relation to power. Such practices, as I show throughout this dissertation, 
nevertheless lay the groundwork upon which people can activate their hopeful capacities and cultivate 
their version of a more bountiful future. 
  It should be clear, however, that hope is not enough if we wish to build a more generous 
‘otherwise’. Individual practice, as these women try to do, will not suffice. We require other modes of 
organising social life that is not premised on injurious modes of normalcy, gender inequality, racism, 
and economic precarity and vulnerability. These will not come about by celebrating hope or simply 
adding it to our prevailing political toolkit, although in an era of worrying spectres this is necessary, of 
course. Rather, we require critical analysis, collective forms of world-building, and theoretical and 
methodological approaches that not only tack back and forth between the personal and political, but 
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